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The False Claims Act and Corporate
Criminal Liability: Qui Tam Actions,
Corporate Integrity Agreements and the
Overlap of Criminal and Civil Law
Sharon Finegan*
Imagine an individual has committed a wrongful act in violation of
the law. Perhaps that person was driving recklessly down the highway at
a high rate of speed and ran into another car, injuring the occupant of that
car. A wrong has occurred and society wishes to remedy that wrong, but
what remedies are available? In the United States two types of legal
actions are typically used to address such conduct: first, the government
could prosecute the wrongdoer criminally for violation of a criminal
statute; second, the injured party could sue the wrongdoer in civil court
for violation of a civil statute.1 Either option is available to remedy the
wrong committed, and neither remedy prevents the other from being
pursued.2
The criminal action can only be prosecuted by the government, and
is brought on behalf of the public for purposes of punishment and
deterrence of future criminal acts.3 Typically the criminal sanction
involves either a restriction of the wrongdoer's liberty, or a monetary
penalty, or both.4 On the other hand, a civil action is typically pursued
* Westerfield Fellow, Loyola University New Orleans School of Law; LL.M.
Columbia University, 2005 (Harlan Fiske Stone Scholar); J.D., Summa Cum Laude,
American University, 2001; B.A., The University of Virginia, 1996. Special thanks to
Associate Dean Mark Niles and Professors Mary Algero and John Lovett for their
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1. See Kenneth Mann, Punitive Civil Sanctions. The Middleground Between
Criminal and Civil Law, 101 YALE L.J. 1795, 1796 (1992).
2. See Peter Ball & Karen Pickett, Parallel Criminal and Civil Prosecutions in
Mass. Federal Court: Double Trouble or Hidden Opportunity for the Defendant?, 46
B.B.J. 18 (Dec. 2002).
3. See Timothy Stolzfus Jost & Sharon L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A
Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239,
281 (1999) (noting the different parties and goals of civil and criminal law).
4. Further, in limited circumstances governments have the ability to execute the
wrongdoer. See Joseph L. Lester, Presumed Innocent, Feared Dangerous: The Eighth
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by an injured private individual on his own behalf, and not for the benefit
of the public.5  The civil remedy is typically. less severe, usually
consisting of a monetary award, although in certain circumstances
injunctive relief can also be awarded.6 Thus, it is clear that two basic
distinctions between criminal and civil actions are the parties who pursue
the action (whether it is the government or an injured private citizen) and
the severity of the available penalty.
7
Now, imagine an entirely different wrongdoing. Instead of a person
committing a wrongful act, imagine a corporation committing an act in
violation of the law. Perhaps a chemical manufacturer is dumping toxic
waste into a stream which ultimately causes injury to people living
nearby. A wrong has clearly occurred, but what remedies are available
in this situation? Because, in the United States, corporations can commit
criminal acts much like an individual, the chemical manufacturer in our
hypothetical can be prosecuted criminally by the government. 8 Further,
those injured by the chemical dumping could sue the company in a civil
action. A third action is also available in this circumstance that would
not be present in the first hypothetical posed: an administrative agency
could pursue a civil action against the chemical company for its
wrongdoing.
9
In this circumstance, we begin to see the blurring of the above-
mentioned demarcation between criminal and civil law. First, the parties
may be the same in both the criminal and civil action-the government,
acting as a prosecutor or a plaintiff, can pursue either criminal or civil
sanctions. Second, the severity of the penalty may not be very different
Amendment's Right to Bail, 32 N. Ky. L. REV.I, 32 (2005) (noting that "[t]here are five
types of punishment available in the criminal justice system: imprisonment, fines,
probation, restitution, and death").
5. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1812 ("Following the English example, by the
twentieth century, the paradigms of civil and criminal law in the United States indicated
that the state held the role of moving party in the criminal law, whereas a private party
was the moving party in civil law.").
6. See, e.g. Michael D. Sousa, Equitable Powers of a Bankruptcy Court: Federal
All Writs Act and § 105 of the Code, 25 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 28, 28 (2006) (noting that
"[w]hen determining whether to issue an injunction under § 105, courts generally require
the moving party to satisfy the four-prong standard for the issuance of a preliminary
injunction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65").
7. See Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer 1997, at 23, 35.
8. See V.S. Khanna, Corporate Criminal Liability: What Purpose Does It Serve?,
109 HARV. L. REV. 1477, 1488-89 (1996) (discussing the broad nature of corporate
criminal liability in the United States and noting that "[a] corporation may be criminally
liable for almost any crime except acts manifestly requiring commission by natural
persons, such as rape and murder.").
9. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 27 (discussing the expansion of the regulatory state
and use of civil actions to prosecute wrongdoing).
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between the civil and criminal context.1 ° In criminal actions against a
corporation, incarceration and execution are unavailable punishments.
Instead, monetary penalties would be the typical sanction imposed in
both criminal and civil proceedings. 1" A basic distinction still exists,
however, between the criminal and civil proceedings in this context.
Private parties must still suffer personal injury in order to pursue a case
and they cannot bring suit on behalf of the public. 12 Thus, despite some
overlap between criminal and civil law, a basic distinction between
criminal and civil actions remains: the government is the only party that
can seek criminal sanctions.
Let us now imagine a third, more complex wrongdoing, in which a
pharmaceutical company violates criminal and civil law by providing
monetary incentives to doctors to prescribe its drugs to patients. The
Anti-Kickback statute criminalizes such behavior on the part of health
care companies and providers.' 3 As discussed above, the government
can prosecute a corporation for violation of criminal law. Under the
United States Sentencing Guidelines, the government, in seeking
sanctions against the company, could seek monetary penalties and the
imposition of a Corporate Integrity Agreement 14 to govern the future
practices of the corporation. 15 A civil action to remedy the wrongful
conduct could also be pursued by the state for a violation of the False
Claims Act ("FCA"), which penalizes the submission of false claims to
the federal government.' 6 In this civil suit by the government, monetary
sanctions and the imposition of a Corporate Integrity Agreement would
be among the remedies available.' 7 Finally, the FCA allows for private
citizens to sue a company on the government's behalf under its "qui tam"
provisions. 18 In this way, a private citizen can pursue a civil action even
10. See Mary Kreiner Ramirez, The Science Fiction of Corporate Criminal Liability:
Containing the Machine Through the Corporate Death Penalty, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 933,
943 (2005) (Because of the nature of the corporation, sanctions imposed for criminal
liability are not substantially distinct from the sanctions imposed for civil liability .... ).
11. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1497 (noting that "[n]onmonetary penalties, such as
imprisonment, are not applicable in the corporate context").
12. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1806 ("The paradigmatic civil sanction... applies to
conduct that causes actual damage to an individual interest; this is generally a
prerequisite to civil liability.").
13. See 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b (2000).
14. A Corporate Integrity Agreement is an agreement in which a corporation agrees
to compliance standards that are more stringent than the law mandates. Corporate
Integrity Agreements are usually negotiated with the government, but similar compliance
programs can also be imposed by private parties. See discussion, infra Part V.A.
15. See U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual § 8C2.5(f) (1998).
16. The False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
17. See id. § 3729; see also ROBERT FABRIKANT, PAUL E. KALB, ET AL., HEALTH
CARE FRAUD ENFORCEMENT AND COMPLIANCE § 9.05 (2001).
18. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
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though he may not have suffered injury from the wrongdoing because he
is suing on behalf of the United States. 19 The remedies for such an action
are essentially the same as those in the criminal suit-a party may seek
monetary damages and the imposition of a corporate integrity program to
govern the defendant corporation for a period of time.20
Through this progression, the overlap of criminal and civil law can
be seen. A private party may pursue an action for the public's benefit,
although that party may not have been injured. When the wrongdoer is a
corporation, the private party may also seek the same damages that are
imposed in a criminal action. Thus, it appears that a private party may,
in effect, prosecute wrongdoers and seek the same sanctions as the
government in criminal actions, blurring the basic distinctions between
criminal and civil law.
This Article will examine the ramifications of this overlap of
criminal and civil law, focusing particularly on the third scenario above:
actions under the False Claims Act and the imposition of corporate
integrity programs. This Article will first examine paradigmatic
distinctions between criminal and civil law in the United States.2' Next,
this Article will discuss the phenomenon of the bluffing between
criminal and civil law.22 This Article will then analyze the FCA and qui
tam litigation under the FCA.23 Next, the recent trend in corporate
criminal prosecution and its contribution to the blurring between criminal
and civil law will be examined.24 Further, this Article will discuss
corporate integrity programs and the problems associated with the
imposition of such programs in the settlement of civil litigation. 5
Finally, this Article will address the problems associated with the
blurring of criminal and civil law in the context of qui tam actions under
the FCA.26
I. Traditional Distinctions Between Criminal and Civil Law in the
United States
Prior to the industrial revolution and the growth of governmental
law enforcement mechanisms, the distinction between criminal and civil
law was not pronounced. Without a professional police force and
19. See Stephanie Greene, False Claims Act Liability for Off-Label Promotion of
Pharmaceutical Products, 110 PENN. ST. L. REv. 41, 54 (2005).
20. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729: see also Ken Blickenstaff, Strong Medicine: The
Evolution of Healthcare Fraud Enforcement, ADVOCATE, Sept. 1999, at 15.
21. See discussion infra Part I.
22. See discussion infra Part II.
23. See discussion infra Part III.
24. See discussion infra Part IV.
25. See discussion infra Part V.
26. See discussion infra Part VI.
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professional prosecutors to enforce the criminal statutes, wrongful
activity was often rectified by private litigants. 7 Once the federal and
state governments began expanding their law enforcement capabilities,
the distinction between criminal and civil law became more marked 8 In
the latter half of the nineteenth century and through the twentieth
century, there developed clear distinctions between criminal and civil
law in the United States.2 9 These distinctions range from the procedural
to the theoretical and exhibit a wide divide between traditional
conceptions of criminal and civil law.
The distinctions between criminal and civil law begin with the
fundamental principle that criminal actions seek to remedy a public
wrong, while civil actions seek to compensate for a private injury.3 °
Criminal laws protect and enforce general societal norms, whereas civil
law provides either a method for private parties to be compensated for an
activity that harms them or it prevents such harm from occurring in the
first place.3' Scholars often refer to this distinction as a difference
between punishing wrongful conduct (criminal law) and pricing
wrongful conduct (civil law).32
Under the civil law, an actor can engage in wrongful activity as long
as he is willing to compensate those harmed by such activity.3 In this
way, the civil law encourages a calculus on the part of an actor to
determine the cost of refraining from activity that would cause a harm
27. See Pamela H. Bucy, Information as a Commodity in the Regulatory World, 39
Hous. L. REV. 905, 910 (2002) (noting that "[b]ecause there was no law enforcement,
self-help was the only option, and apparently it was a necessary option").
28. See id. at 910-11 (noting that private citizens could no longer pursue criminal
actions against wrongdoers).
29. Carol S. Steiker, Punishment and Procedure: Punishment Theory and the
Criminal-Civil Procedural Divide, 85 GEO. L.J. 775, 782-83 (1997) (noting that "[t]he
binary distinction with which every contemporary American law student and most
laypeople are now familiar probably did not begin to look recognizable to modem eyes
until sometime during the nineteenth century") (quoting Gail Heriot, An Essay on the
Civil-Criminal Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUEs, 43, 44 (1996)).
30. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 281.
31. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 27.
32. See, e.g. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections
on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV. 193, 194
(1991).
33. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 266-67. "Optimal deterrence" is achieved in
civil tort cases when the costs associated with preventing wrongful conduct are not
excessive. In other words, the penalty should be high enough that the tortfeasor
"internalizes all the costs that her conduct imposes on a victim." Id. However, the
penalty should not be so high that it forces the tortfeasor to "spend too much on loss
avoidance, or... compel the tortfeasor to forego the gains potentially achievable through
injurious conduct that exceed the losses that such conduct imposes on the victim." Id.
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versus the cost of compensating for a harm.3 4 If the cost to the actor to
prevent a harm is greater than the cost of compensating for the harm, the
actor is encouraged to engage in the wrongful conduct. Under the
criminal law, however, such pricing is not encouraged. Criminal laws
reflect prohibitions on activity that society is unwilling to accept,
regardless of the actor's willingness to compensate for harm he or she
has caused.35  Indeed, criminal law is generally unconcerned with the
amount of harm caused because it seeks to discourage all criminal
conduct. Thus, the criminal law is focused on punishing and preventing
the wrongful activity that caused the harm, but is focused on
compensating and not the harm itself.36  Consequently, to ensure
compliance with criminal law, criminal sanctions are extremely
burdensome. In this way, criminal law seeks to guide the behavior of
society through enforcement of social norms.37  Because of this
distinction between the basic goal and function of criminal and civil law,
different actors, with different motivations, seek to remedy criminal and
civil wrongs.
Since the latter half of the nineteenth century, criminal law has been
enforced by the government while civil law has generally been pursued
by private litigants.3 8 Criminal law seeks to protect and preserve public
norms by encouraging "socially desirable behavior. 3 9 Because of the
public nature of criminal law, the Supreme Court has made it clear that
government agents prosecuting criminal wrongs cannot be motivated by
self-interest.4 0  On the other hand, private civil plaintiffs are typically
34. See id.
35. See Coffee, supra note 32, at 194 (noting that "the criminal law often and
necessarily displays a deliberate disdain for the utility of the criminalized conduct to the
defendant").
36. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 267. "Criminal penalties, it is argued, must
achieve 'complete deterrence,' i.e., completely dissuade the potential criminal from
pursuing forbidden conduct, as opposed to 'optimal deterrence,' which implies deterrence
only to the point at which society loses more in the costs of deterrence efforts than it does
from the harm it seeks to deter." Id.
37. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1805 ("Punishment in the criminal law, then, can be
understood as either a retributive and completely nonutilitarian act or as a means to
achieve social control.").
38. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 27. Judge Lynch notes that "[t]he traditional rough
distinction between criminal and civil matters has been that criminal actions are brought
by the sovereign to punish and deter violations of social norms, while civil actions are
brought by private parties (or occasionally by the government in a proprietary or
administrative capacity) to compensate those who have suffered damage or to prevent
harms from occurring." Id.
39. See Steiker, supra note 29, at 785.
40. See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987). In Young, the defendants were
sued by Louis Vuitton for trademark infringement. Id. at 790. The infringement suit
resulted in a permanent injunction preventing any future infringement. 1d. The
defendants later were accused of violating the permanent injunction and were charged
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motivated by self-interest and seek compensation for a harm that they
have suffered through the wrongdoing of another.4 ' Indeed, under the
doctrine of standing, private civil plaintiffs must be motivated by self-
interest.42 In other words, private civil plaintiffs must have a cognizable
legal injury in order to pursue a civil action against a wrongdoer.43
Once litigation has commenced, different procedural rules
accompany the different types of litigation. In a criminal action, charges
must be proven beyond a reasonable doubt, whereas in a civil action a
lesser burden of proof is required.44  Further, most criminal actions
require the wrongful conduct be either intentional or reckless. 45 In civil
actions, generally the level of mens rea required is negligence.46
A reason for these procedural distinctions, and another difference
between civil and criminal law, is reflected in the penalties available in
with criminal contempt. Id. The district court allowed Vuitton's lawyers to prosecute the
criminal contempt action against the infringing defendants. Id. at 791. The United States
Supreme Court, on appeal, noted that "courts have long had, and must continue to have,
the authority to appoint private attorneys to initiate [criminal contempt] proceedings
when the need arises." Id. at 800-01. Yet the Court held that it is impermissible for a
criminal defendant to be prosecuted by an individual with a personal interest in the
outcome of the litigation. Id. at 814. In so holding, the court explained that private
interests should not influence the exercise of a public duty. Id. at 805-06. Because of the
great power that prosecutors possess, the Court noted that individuals "must have
assurance that those who would wield this power will be guided solely by their sense of
public responsibility for the attainment of justice." Id. at 814. Thus, under the Court's
ruling in Young, prosecutors may not have a personal interest in the outcome of a
criminal action.
41. See Steiker, supra note 29, at 784-85.
42. See Richard Pierce, Jr., Is Standing Law or Politics?, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1741, 1742
(1999).
43. See id.
44. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 248; see also Victor E. Schwartz & Mark A.
Behrens, Federal Product Liability Reform in 1997: History and Public Policy Support
Its Enactment Now, 64 TENN. L. REv. 595, 615-16 (1997) (noting that civil counts must
typically be proven using a "preponderance of the evidence" standard, although in many
states, civil claims for punitive damages require a "clear and convincing evidence"
burden of proof).
45. See Noel Wise, Personal Liability Promotes Responsible Conduct: Extending the
Responsible Corporate Officer Doctrine to Federal Civil Environmental Enforcement
Cases, 21 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 283, 290 (2002). Traditionally criminal law in the United
States required mens rea or culpability on the part of the defendant. John Hasnas, Ethics
and the Problem of White Collar Crime, 54 AM. U. L. REV. 579, 607 (2005). Over the
course of the last century, however, the criminal law has expanded to include some
offenses that criminalize negligent conduct. Id. Indeed, some public welfare offenses are
governed by strict liability statutes, requiring no scienter at all on the part of the
defendant. Id.
46. While negligence is the general standard required in civil cases, certain civil
actions require a showing of intent, while other actions require no mens rea at all. See,
e.g., Wise, supra note 45, at 290 (noting that, in addition to the general standard of
negligence, some civil statutes are strict liability statutes and have no mens rea
requirement).
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criminal and civil actions. Because they seek to deter and punish these
public wrongs, criminal penalties are generally harsher than civil
remedies, including imprisonment and execution as potential sentences.47
Civil remedies, on the other hand, usually involve monetary and
injunctive relief and generally do not impinge upon the liberty of the
wrongdoer.48 Thus, in order to ensure full compliance with the criminal
law, the severity of the sanctions available in a criminal action is much
greater than that available to the civil plaintiff.49 While harsher penalties
are available in criminal actions, the range of criminal penalties tends to
be less nuanced than those available in civil actions.50 Penalties
available under criminal law tend to be more "black-and-white and one-
size-fits-all, whereas civil sanctions are, by and large, more graduated
and sophisticated.
' 51
Further, because of the severity of criminal sanctions,
"[h]istorically, we have expected the criminal law to be narrower and
more precise than the law of civil wrongs[.] ' '52  Criminal laws are
definitive and certain, and ambiguities are resolved in favor of the
criminal defendant.53 The rule of lenity ensures that potential defendants
are provided with adequate notice of a criminal prohibition, enabling
them to conform their conduct to the law.54 This rule prevents excessive
encroachment on the liberty interests of individuals and protects those
innocent of the requisite intent to violate the law.
Perhaps the greatest difference between criminal and civil law, and
the reason for all of the above distinctions, is the moral condemnation
which accompanies a criminal conviction and does not accompany an
adverse civil verdict.5 5 "[T]he real force of the criminal sanction ... is
47. See Xavier Fellmeth, Challenges and Implications of a Systemic Social Effect
Theory, 2006 U. ILL. REV. 691, 694-95 (2006).
48. Civil remedies can, in fact, encroach upon the liberty of an individual under very
limited circumstances. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 30. A judge in a civil action can
incarcerate a litigant for civil contempt. Id. Further, under the laws of civil commitment,
a person determined to be of potential harm to himself or others can be committed to an
institution through a civil proceeding. Id.
49. See Fellmeth, supra note 47, at 694-95.
50. See Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Andersen Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 107, 115 (2006).
51. Id.
52. Lynch, supra note 7, at 29.
53. See Williams v. United States, 458 U.S. 279, 290 (1982); see also Note: The
New Rule of Lenity, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2420, 2420 (2006) [hereinafter The New Rule of
Lenity] (discussing recent criticism directed at the rule of lenity).
54. See The New Rule of Lenity, supra note 53, at 2420-21.
55. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 35. "Thus, from the economic perspective, the
traditional category of the criminal largely reflects a pragmatic judgment that some norms
cannot be efficiently policed by private actions brought by the aggrieved party, requiring
some collective responsibility if the harmful behavior is to be efficiently reduced to an
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its unparalleled power to communicate a code of moral conduct, the
composition of which demarcates the outer boundary of acceptable
human behavior., 56 Thus, a criminal sanction brands the wrongdoer with
a moral stigma that no amount of compensation can correct. Civil
remedies, on the other hand, are not automatically associated with moral
condemnation.' Indeed, "the aim of a civil regulatory and penalty
scheme is to deter certain harmful conduct by pricing it in such a way as
to make it economically undesirable, while countenancing that violations
will occur when economic efficiencies make them desirable." 58 Thus,
society is willing to accept the wrongful behavior of an actor as long as
that actor is willing to pay the penalties imposed in a civil suit arising
from his conduct. 59 Because of the moral condemnation attached to
criminal conduct, there is no such acceptance of wrongful behavior in the
criminal context, and society imposes harsh penalties on criminal
offenders because it seeks to prohibit the conduct altogether, rather than
permitting and exacting a cost for the activity.6 °
It is perhaps because of the moral stigma associated with criminal
convictions that the distinctions between criminal and civil law are
necessary. Society needs to ensure that certain behavior is considered so
unacceptable that no amount of compensation permits its indulgence.61
Thus, such behavior must result in severe sanctions and moral
disapproval. If criminal and civil sanctions resulted in the same penalties
and the same moral stigma, the punishment for engaging in minor
wrongful acts would be too severe while at the same time the moral
disapprobation associated with criminal activity would be weakened.62
Thus, the current trend of blurring distinctions between criminal and civil
law is problematic. Safeguards are needed to protect the rights of
defendants who are the subject of civil suits with decidedly criminal
characteristics.
II. The Modem Overlap of Criminal and Civil Liability
The blurring of criminal and civil law can be seen in a variety of
contexts and has become a progressively common phenomenon in recent
acceptable level. The same uncertainties of enforcement generate a need for higher
sanctions to deter misconduct, which in turn generates a need for special, more stringent
protections against erroneous invocation of the sanction." Id.
56. Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 284.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 282.
59. See id.
60. Id.
61. See id. at 284.
62. See Coffee, supra note 32, at 200-01.
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years.63 Ever increasing numbers of criminal statutes have expanded the
scope of criminal law to include areas which were previously addressed
through civil litigation.64 At the same time, civil statutes have taken on
increasingly public and punitive functions traditionally addressed by
criminal law.
65
In the criminal context, laws directed at corporate wrongdoing and
"white collar crime" now criminalize wrongful conduct that was
previously remedied through civil suit.66 The Sarbanes-Oxley statute is
an example of such expansion of criminal law. 67 Sarbanes-Oxley created
four new crimes relating to financial fraud.68 The statute requires
publicly traded corporations to have independent audit committee
members, reporting mechanisms through which violations are to be
disclosed, and certification of compliance with the law. 69 Further, under
the statute, a corporation can be criminally liable for improperly
certifying the accuracy of its disclosures.7 °  Thus, Sarbanes-Oxley
criminalizes conduct that was traditionally addressed through private
civil or regulatory action.
Civil actions have also expanded into the realm of criminal law.
This expansion is exhibited in part by governmental pursuit of civil
63. See Steiker, supra note 29, at 783. "In the latter part of this century, however,
this sharp distinction [between criminal and civil law] has become more difficult for
courts to maintain with any clarity. This blurring or destabilization of the criminal-civil
distinction is partly due to the increase in the sheer number of 'hybrid' legal institutions
and practices: '[firom civil penalties to punitive damages, civil forfeiture to criminal
restitution, legal devices that are arguably criminal-civil hybrids seem to be more
common than they were a century ago."' Id. (quoting Gail Heriot, An Essay on the
Criminal-Civil Distinction with Special Reference to Punitive Damages, 7 J. CONTEMP.
LEGAL ISSUES 43, 45 (1996)).
64. See Coffee, supra note 32, at 199.
65. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1798; Steiker, supra note 29, at 792.
66. See Bucy, supra note 27, at 923-34. Economic crimes in particular have become
the focus of expanding criminal law. See id. New criminal laws are created to address
complex regulatory violations that were traditionally the subject of civil suit. See id. In
addition, the growth of wrongdoing using computers and the internet has been addressed
by the creation of criminal statutes prohibiting such conduct. Id. "Traditional crimes are
not simply easier to commit because of computerization; there are new crimes. These
crimes blur the line between criminal and civil law, are committed by different types of
criminals than in the past, and require new law enforcement tactics." Id.
67. Disclosure Required by Sections 406 and 407 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of
2002, 68 Fed. Reg. 5110 (Jan. 31, 2003) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 228, 229, 249).
68. Pamela H. Bucy, "Carrots and Sticks ": Post-Enron Regulatory Initiatives, 8
BUFF. CRIM. L. REV. 277, 282 (2004).
69. See Paula J. Desio, Fundamentals of Organizational Compliance, 1421
PLI/Corp. 673, 692-94 (2004).
70. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b) (2004); see also Desio, supra note 69, at 693. Sarbanes-
Oxley criminalizes the failure of a publicly traded company's CEO and CFO to certify
that financial reports filed with the SEC fairly present the financial condition and results
of business operations of that company. 18 U.S.C. § 1350(b).
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remedies where criminal remedies were traditionally sought. 7' However,
the expansion is also seen in civil suits, brought by private citizens, that
further public goals.
72
The growth of the regulatory state has created a system by which
the government regularly pursues civil actions against wrongdoers for
the benefit of the public, rather than criminal actions which traditionally
served the same function.73 There are several reasons for the use of civil,
rather than criminal, suits by the government in remedying wrongdoing.
First, because regulatory agencies have greater resources and better
knowledge of the industry which they regulate, civil actions are often
more easily pursued by those agencies than by a public prosecutor.74 A
criminal prosecutor would have to familiarize herself with an entire
industry in order to pursue a criminal action against a wrongdoer,
whereas a regulatory agency already has the specialized knowledge of
the industry necessary to competently pursue a civil action against that
same wrongdoer. 75
A second reason civil actions are pursued by the government in
cases traditionally addressed by criminal actions relates to the lesser
burden of proof and relaxed procedural rules available in civil suits. 76 In
a criminal action, the government has the burden of proving all material
elements of a crime beyond a reasonable doubt.77  This standard is
difficult to meet generally, but, in complex economic crimes, it is
particularly burdensome.78 Procedural rules are also less onerous for the
government in civil actions than in criminal actions. A lower burden of
71. Lynch, supra note 7, at 34.
72. Id. at 35.
73. Id. Under modem conditions, this simple binary division breaks down, as well
(from this perspective) it should. The growth of specialized state regulatory organs
makes state intervention far more ordinary than in the days of the common law of crimes,
and makes possible the control of at least some sorts of harmful behavior by lower, more
regularly applied sanctions. Id.
74. See id. The use of specialized agencies rather than generalist criminal
prosecutors allows for a more informed enforcement mechanism. Id. Agencies which
regulate an industry are more able to understand what violations should be addressed
through litigation. Id. Furthermore, regulatory agencies are better suited to determine the
appropriate sanctions to seek against a defendant. See id.
75. See id.
76. See Steiker, supra note 29, at 778-80 (discussing the costly procedural
protections available to defendants in criminal actions); Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at
248 ("[T]he civil [False Claims Act] provides an attractive alternative to prosecutors who
believe that a provider's conduct warrants a severe sanction but at the same time would
prefer to avoid the rigorous procedural burdens imposed by the criminal process.").
77. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 248.
78. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REv. 1, 3 (2002) (noting that
"[clomplex, economic wrongdoing is difficult to categorize as criminal primarily because
it is enormously difficult to prove the high level of mens rea traditionally and
appropriately required in criminal law").
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proof for the government and fewer evidentiary protections available to
defendants in civil actions79 make successful prosecution of a civil claim
more likely and less expensive.
Finally, the government will pursue civil suits instead of criminal
actions because, as discussed above,8 ° the remedies available in civil
actions are often broader and more nuanced than those available in
criminal actions. As Professor Elizabeth Ainslie notes in her discussion
of the Arthur Andersen prosecution, few options were available to the
federal government in seeking criminal sanctions against the
corporationi.t The government could choose to prosecute the firm itself
or individual actors in the firm, but had no method of focusing solely on
the specific offices engaged in the wrongful activity.82  Had the
government chosen to address the wrongful conduct through civil
litigation, it could have tailored the remedy to concentrate on the office
engaged in the illegal conduct, and not subjected other offices, with no
knowledge of or participation in the wrongful conduct, to draconian
penalties.8 3  Thus, the government's increasing use of civil litigation
instead of criminal actions to address wrongful conduct is the result of
numerous factors that make civil litigation more cost-effective, more
likely to succeed, and more able to adequately address the wrongful
behavior.
Even where the government plays no role in the litigation, private
citizen suits can take on the characteristics of a criminal action.84 While
most private citizen suits require injury on the part of the plaintiff to
provide standing to sue, the damages awarded are not always limited to
remedying that injury.85 In addition to actual damage awards, civil
remedies can include punitive sanctions-effectively punishing the
wrongdoer for his action in addition to seeking compensation for
injury. 86  Punitive remedies are a method of preventing future
wrongdoing and, as such, are used for furtherance of the public good,
rather than mere recompense to an injured private party. 7
79. See Mary M. Cheh, Constitutional Limits on Using Civil Remedies to Achieve
Criminal Law Objectives: Understanding and Transcending the Criminal-Civil Law
Distinction, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1325, 1389-91 (1991).
80. See discussion supra Part I, notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
81. See Ainslie, supra note 50, at 115.
82. See id.
83. See id.
84. Lynch, supra note 7, at 30.
85. Id.
86. Id. (noting that "[t]he venerable institution of punitive damages in private tort
actions was expressly designed to go beyond the usual compensatory goal of tort law,
serving the ordinarily 'criminal' purposes of punishing and deterring wrongdoers").
87. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 27 (discussing the increased use of private
whistleblower actions in connection with allegations of government contracting and
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Class actions are another way in which private plaintiffs may pursue
lawsuits that serve a larger social purpose than mere compensation for
the personal injury suffered. 88 Class actions provide a remedy to an
entire class of persons who have been injured by wrongful conduct.
89
The policy at the very core of the class action mechanism is to overcome
the problem that small recoveries do not provide the incentive for any
individual to bring a solo action prosecuting his or her rights.90 By
aggregating the small claims of numerous injured individuals, the class
action creates incentive for an individual to pursue legal action against
the party causing injury.91 Thus, by securing recovery for a larger group
of persons, and not just compensation for an individual's own injury, a
class action provides a social benefit as well as a private remedy.
Further, some statutes provide plaintiffs with a punitive remedy in a
civil proceeding when they are injured by criminal conduct. A prime
example of such a provision is contained within the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organizations statute ("RICO").92 In enacting RICO,
"Congress converted entire sections of the federal criminal code into
civil wrongs" as a way of enforcing criminal law.9 3 Both the federal
government and injured private plaintiffs can seek civil damages under
RICO for violations of the criminal law.94  Treble damages and
attorneys' fees provide incentive to plaintiffs to file suit under the RICO
statute.
95
The previous examples of private plaintiffs pursuing civil actions
which result in societal benefits are limited to situations in which the
plaintiffs themselves have suffered injury. Thus, in most cases, while a
plaintiff can seek relief which remedies more than his own personal
suffering, he must have suffered in some way to seek the relief in the
first place. 96 This is based on a basic precept of American jurisprudence:
program fraud).
88. See Kevin R. Johnson, International Human Rights Class Actions: New
Frontiers for Group Litigation, 2004 MICH. ST. L. REv. 643, 645 (2004) (noting that
"[c]lass actions have long been a favorite tool of social reformers in the United States").
89. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23.
90. Mace v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 109 F.3d 338, 344 (7th Cir. 1997).
91. See id.
92. See Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c)
(1984). RICO was enacted by section 901(a) of the Organized Crime Control Act of
1970.
93. Mann, supra note 1, at 1848.
94. See Bucy, supra note 78, at 19-20.
95. 18 U.S.C. § 1964(c).
96. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). In Lujan, the
Supreme Court of the United States explained "that the irreducible constitutional
minimum of standing contains three elements." Id. First and foremost, standing requires
the plaintiff to have suffered an injury. Id. Second, standing requires a "causal
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of." Id. Third, standing
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a plaintiff must have suffered a cognizable legal injury in order to have
standing to bring civil suit.97 However, there are exceptions to this rule
which further blur the line between the civil and the criminal.
Statutes containing "citizen suit" provisions allow for private
citizens who have not suffered a legally cognizable injury to bring civil
suit against wrongdoers who violate the statute. Citizen suits can be
seen in the environmental and consumer protection context, where some
statutes authorize private plaintiffs to sue for violation of environmental
or consumer protection laws.99  Statutes providing for citizen suits
typically allow for two methods of suit. First, a plaintiff can sue a
governmental agency for failing to properly enforce the law or; second, a
plaintiff can sue the wrongful actor for violating the law. 00 Statutes that
contain citizen suit provisions typically require that the government be
notified of the suit sixty days prior to the filing of the action.10' Most
citizen suits permit the intervention of the government in the action,
should the government choose to participate in the litigation.10 2 Unlike
private civil litigation involving an injured plaintiff, the remedies
available to plaintiffs bringing citizen suits do not benefit the plaintiffs
themselves. 10 3  Citizen suits typically allow for injunctive relief,
providing a way to prevent future unlawful behavior.'0 4  Citizen suit
provisions may also allow for monetary sanctions, with proceeds payable
to the government and not the plaintiff.0 5  The only recompense
available to the plaintiff in citizen suits compensates for attorneys fees
and other costs associated with the suit. 10 6 Thus, citizens who sue under
these provisions are essentially enlisted as "private attorneys general,"
prosecuting infractions of the law on behalf of the government, with
remedies obtained going directly to the public fisc.1
0 7
requires a likelihood of redress "by a favorable decision." Id. at 561. (internal citations
omitted).
97. The doctrine of standing is based on the case or controversy requirement of
Article III of the United States Constitution. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. By requiring that
only plaintiffs who have suffered an injury are allowed to bring suit, the standing doctrine
ensures that courts are presented with an actual case or controversy rather than being
forced to give advisory opinions.
98. Bucy, supra note 78, at 31-32.
99. See id.
100. See id. at 36.
101. See id.
102. See id. at 38.
103. Bucy, supra note 78, at 38-39.
104. See id. at 38.
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See Myriam E. Gilles, Reinventing Structural Reform Litigation: Deputizing
Private Citizens in the Enforcement of Civil Rights, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1384, 1424
(2000).
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Uninjured private citizens may also benefit from bringing suit
against wrongdoers in qui tam actions. "Qui tam" is a shortening of the
Latin phrase: "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se imposo sequitur,"
which is translated to mean "who brings an action as well for the king as
for himself."10 8 Qui tam provisions authorize a private citizen to sue on
his or her own behalf and on behalf of the government. 109 Like a citizen
suit plaintiff, a qui tam plaintiff need not have suffered injury in order to
bring suit.'"' Unlike the plaintiff in a citizen suit, however, a qui tam
plaintiff can garner substantial compensation from bringing suit under a
qui tam statute.1 1
Qui tam suits have a long history in English and American laws.' 12
Historically, qui tam suits were utilized at times in English and American
history when there were limited law enforcement and prosecutorial
resources. 1 13 Without the large government bodies dedicated to policing
and prosecuting wrongdoing available in England and the United States
today, laws needed a method of enforcement to be effective. Thus, from
the fourteenth century until the mid-twentieth century, England allowed
private citizens to enforce some public laws under qui tam provisions. 
14
Enforcement of these laws relied on individuals who had some
knowledge of the wrongdoing. 15  These individuals, known as
informers, were authorized to prosecute the offender and were
incentivized to do so with monetary rewards. 1 6 A private citizen who
observed an illegal act, although unharmed by the act himself, could file
a qui tam suit against the wrongdoer in English court and receive a
portion of the imposed penalty." 7 Typical qui tam statutes governed
economic wrongdoing, regulating everything from the price of wine to
108. JAMES T. BLANCH, BENEDICT S. COHEN, ET AL., CITIZEN SUITS AND QUI TAM
ACTIONS: PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF PUBLIC POLICY 55 n.7 (National Legal Center for the
Public Interest 1996).
109. See id. at 55-56 (a qui tam plaintiff is also referred to as a qui tam relator).
110. See Greene, supra note 19, at 55.
111. See, e.g., Joel Androphy & Adam Peavy, Bringing Rogues to Justice: The Qui
Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 65 TEX. B.J. 128, 129-30 (2002) (noting that the
average award for a qui tam plaintiff in a successful qui tam action under the False
Claims Act is $1 million).
112. See J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradication of Qui
Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 553-54 (2000). Professor Beck, in an extensive
examination of the history of qui tam litigation in England, notes that qui tam litigation
can be traced back to Roman criminal law. See id. at 566.
113. See Bucy, supra note 27, at 910 (explaining that "[i]n thirteenth century England
and in colonial America, informer actions were needed because there was no police force
or prosecuting authority").
114. See Beck, supra note 112, at 570-71.
115. See Bucy, supra note 27, at 909-10.
116. See Beck, supra note 112, at 576.
117. Seeid.at569.
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the tanning of leather." 8 The late fifteenth century saw an increase in the
use of qui tam legislation, while at the same time a host of problems
associated with qui tam litigation began to arise.'19 Professional
informers engaged in a variety of abuses in order to claim large
rewards. 120  By the twentieth century, the popularity of the qui tam
statute had diminished in England and, in 1951, Parliament ended the use
of the qui tam suit as an enforcement tool.12' The reason for the decline
in popularity of the qui tam statute in England relates to both the
corruption associated with qui tam enforcement and the rise of the
competent governmental bodies able to enforce the laws. 122 As public
prosecutors and law enforcement agencies became more common and
accrued more resources, the need for private enforcement of public
statutes was no longer necessary. 123
The United States also has a history of utilizing qui tam provisions
to enforce public laws, although, historically, the practice never was as
popular in the United States as it was in England. 24  Few statutes
containing qui tam provisions exist in the United States today.
25
118. Seeid. at570-71.
119. See id. at 573-74; see also Bucy, supra note 27, at 913.
120. Informers who became familiar with the function and rewards of qui tam
litigation quickly learned how to exploit the system in order to secure the greatest benefit.
See Bucy, supra note 27, at 913. Successful defense of a qui tam suit would typically
immunize defendants from future actions by the state for the same conduct. See id.
Thus, collusion between informers and defendants often occurred, where an informer
would conspire with a potential defendant to bring a meritless qui tam action against him.
See id. The defendant would succeed in the case, and would be immunized from future
litigation. Informers also brought suit for technical violations of a statute, or for
violations of "obsolete or little-known statutes" that would not have been enforced by the
state. Id. Finally, because of the enormous power wielded by qui tam plaintiffs, they
were able to blackmail potential defendants. See id. at 914. Wrongdoers would
compensate qui tam plaintiffs if they agreed not to file suit. See id. at 914-15. Even
those who had not engaged in wrongful conduct, but feared the consequences of going to
court, may have been threatened into payment by unscrupulous qui tam plaintiffs. See
id.; see also Beck, supra note 112, at 576-85.
121. See Beck, supra note 112, at 604-08 ("With a host of charges laid against him
and no one willing to come to his defense, the common informer was expelled from
English law without dissent.").
122. See id. at 601-02.
123. See id. at 603.
124. See id. at 553-54. But see Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United
States, 529 U.S. 765, 776 (2000) (noting that "[q]ui tam actions appear to have been as
prevalent in America as in England, at least in the period immediately before and after
the framing of the Constitution").
125. In addition to the False Claims Act, which is discussed at length in Part III of
this article, infra, there are three other qui tam statutes in existence in the United States
today. These statutes include: "25 U.S.C. § 81 (providing cause of action and share of
recovery against a person contracting with Indians in an unlawful manner); § 201
(providing cause of action and share of recovery against a person violating Indian
protection laws); and, 35 U.S.C. § 292(b) (providing cause of action and share of
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However, the rarity of statutes containing qui tam provisions belies the
incredible rise in qui tam litigation within the last twenty years. 126 The
current source of almost all qui tam litigation in the United States is the
False Claims Act, 127 and amendments to the Act made in 1986128 are the
reason for the sudden surge of qui tam litigation.129
Il1. The False Claims Act and Qui Tam Litigation
A. History of the FCA and Qui Tam Litigation
The False Claims Act ("FCA") was enacted during the Civil War to
address and prevent rampant fraud on the government perpetrated by
army contractors. 30 Broadly worded, the FCA prohibited the submission
of any "false, fictitious or fraudulent claim to the federal government"
and allowed for qui tam suits to enforce the law.13 1 Often referred to as
"Lincoln's law," the act originally contained both criminal and civil
provisions and allowed the qui tam plaintiff, also known as a "relator," to
recover fifty percent of the damages awarded. 32 After its enactment and
use against defense contractors during the Civil War, the FCA fell out of
favor and was rarely used until the Second World War.' 33 In the 1940s,
qui tam suits began to be filed by plaintiffs who based their suits on
publicly available information.1 34 These relators realized the profitability
of qui tam litigation and brought qui tam suits based on information
contained in criminal indictments. 135 Nothing in the 1863 version of the
FCA prohibited the use of information already available to the
government as the basis for a qui tam suit.1 36 Thus, plaintiffs in these qui
recovery against a person falsely marking patented articles)." Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources, 529 U.S. at 769 n. 1.
126. Gregory G. Brooker, The False Claims Act: Congress Giveth and the Courts
Taketh Away, 25 HAMLINE L. REV. 373, 382 (2002).
127. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2000).
128. See id.
129. See Bucy, supra note 78, at 48 (noting that prior to the 1986 amendments to the
FCA, an average of six qui tam suits were filed per year; following the enactment of the
amendments and until the year 2000 more than 3326 qui tam cases were filed).
130. See John T. Boese & Beth C. McClain, Why Thompson is Wrong: Misuse of the
False Claims Act to Enforce the Anti-Kickback Act, 51 ALA. L. REV. 1, 9 (1999).
131. See Brooker, supra note 126, at 376.
132. See Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939,
945 (2002); Brooker, supra note 126, at 377-78.
133. See Christopher C. Frieden, Protecting the Government's Interests: Qui Tam
Actions Under the False Claims Act and the Government's Right to Veto Settlements of
Those Actions, 47 EMORY L.J. 1041, 1045 (1998).
134. See Robert Salcido, The Government's Increasing Use of the False Claims Act
Against the Health Care Industry, 24 J. LEGAL MED. 457, 460 (2003).
135. See id.
136. See Beck, supra note 112, at 558.
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tam actions were able to reap large monetary awards for essentially
telling the government what it already knew. 37  Consequently, the
federal government took action to prevent these "parasitic lawsuits" and
amended the FCA, making it more difficult for qui tam lawsuits to be
brought. 138 Under these new provisions of the FCA, qui tam suits could
not be based on publicly available information. 139 Further, the federal
government could choose to intervene and take over qui tam suits upon
receiving notice of their commencement.1 40  Finally, the 1943
amendments to the FCA reduced the potential recovery a qui tam relator
could receive in a successful suit.' 4 1 Following these amendments, fewer
actions were brought under the FCA and its qui tam provisions were used
infrequently until 1986.142
B. 1986 Amendments to the FCA
In 1986 Congress enacted significant changes to the FCA, making
the qui tam provisions much more attractive to potential plaintiffs.
14 3
137. See id.
138. See Brooker, supra note 126, at 377-78 ("Congress came close in 1943 to
barring all qui tam actions under the FCA but ultimately voted to restrict the ability of
many to commence them."). In 1943 the FCA came close to being repealed by Congress.
Reacting to a letter from the Attorney General which discussed the problem of parasitic
lawsuits, both the Senate and the House of Representatives voted to repeal the statute.
See Beck, supra note 112, at 558. However, the strong opposition of a Senator from
North Dakota saved the qui tam provisions of the FCA from being repealed. See id.
Nevertheless, the 1943 amendments reflect significant restrictions on qui tam actions.
See id.
139. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A) (2000). The relevant provision of the amended
FCA provides that:
No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this section based upon
the public disclosure of allegations or transactions in a criminal, civil, or
administrative hearing, in a congressional, administrative or Government
Accounting Office report, hearing, audit or investigation, or from the news
media, unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information. Id.
140. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2); see also Brooker, supra note 126, at 378.
141. See Brooker, supra note 126, at 378. The 1943 amendments to the FCA reduced
the potential recovery of a qui tam relator from fifty percent of the penalty imposed to a
maximum twenty-five percent recovery. See id.
142. See id. at 378-79.
143. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Congress has also enacted legislation making the
use of the FCA more attractive to government prosecutors. Health Insurance Portability
and Accountability Act, Pub. L. No. 104-91, 110 Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified at 42 U.S.C.
§201 (1996)). In addition to the government's interest in preventing violations of the
law, FCA suits are of great financial benefit to the government. Recent legislation has
authorized the use of proceeds from such suits to help fund the budgets of the Department
of Justice and the Office of the Inspector General, a fact which clearly encourages the
government to seek out FCA violators. See Salcido, supra note 134, n.35. "Congress, as
a part of [the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996-HIPAA],
authorized DOJ and OIG to bolster their budgets through their own civil fraud
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The instigation for these changes was the significant media attention
focused on several instances of overcharging by government defense
contractors.144 As the Senate Committee on the Judiciary explained in its
report on the proposed amendments; "[i]n the face of sophisticated and
widespread fraud, the Committee believes only a coordinated effort of
both the Government and the citizenry will decrease this wave of
defrauding public funds."145 In order to encourage qui tam suits under
the FCA, Congress eased restrictions on qui tam actions put in place by
the 1943 amendments and increased the potential recovery available to
qui tam plaintiffs.1 46  Under the new version of the FCA, qui tam
plaintiffs can continue participating in the lawsuit even if the government
chooses to intervene. 147 Further, the qui tam plaintiff is able to recover
damages regardless of whether the government intervenes.1 48 Also, the
recovery allowed under the 1986 amendments is significant.149 The FCA
now provides for penalties of up to $11,000 per false claim submitted
"plus three times the amount of damages which the Government
sustains. .. .,,150 A qui tam relator can claim anywhere from 15-25% of
this recovery if the government intervenes in his case, and 25-30% of the
recovery if the government does not choose to intervene.15' Thus, the
1986 amendments guarantee that a qui tam plaintiff will recover at least
15% of the damages awarded in a successful qui tam suit, regardless of
governmental intervention or the amount of participation."' Further,
successful qui tam plaintiffs are awarded attorneys fees and costs,
creating even greater incentives for potential plaintiffs to file suit under
the FCA.
15 3
Treble damages and high penalties per claim have led to huge
recoveries in qui tam cases. 154 In statistics provided by the United States
Department of Justice, qui tam settlements and judgments totaled well
over $9 billion from the enactment of the 1986 amendments through
recoveries." Id. at 493.
144. See Beck, supra note 112, at 561 (discussing the public scandals associated with
Department of Defense contractors in the 1980s and noting that such scandals "may have
had more to do with an inefficient procurement system than with fraud").
145. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 2 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5266, 5267.
146. See Greene, supra note 19, at 55-56 (2005).
147. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(3) (2000).
148. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2).
149. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a).
150. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a); 28 C.F.R. 85.3(a)(9) (2003).
151. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(1) & (2).
152. See id.
153. See id.
154. Civil Division, U.S. Department of Justice, Fraud Statistics Overview: Oct. 1,
1986-Sept. 31, 2005, available at, http://www.taf.org/fcastatistics2006.pdf.
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2005. 155 Over the same period, qui tam plaintiffs recovered over $1.5
billion in cases where the government intervened, and over $99 million
in cases in which the government did not intervene.1
5 6
While the increased recovery encouraged qui tam relators to file
suits under the FCA, Congress did not stop there in enacting amendments
that promoted qui tam actions. 157 Among other amendments to the FCA,
Congress lessened the intent required to maintain a successful FCA
action. 58 The FCA prohibits the knowing presentation of a false claim
for payment. 159 Prior to the 1986 amendments, a relator needed to prove
that a defendant had the specific intent to defraud the federal
government.160 The "knowing" standard of the FCA was changed by the
1986 amendments, and now a defendant need not have specific intent but
merely "reckless or deliberate ignorance of the truth or falsity" of the
claim presented. 16' Further, Congress lowered the burden of proof from
a "clear and convincing" standard to a "preponderance of the evidence"
standard, making it easier for the government and qui tam plaintiffs to
successfully sue. 162  Congress provided further incentives to qui tam
plaintiffs by including a "whistleblower" provision in the FCA. 163 Under
Title 31, section 3730(h) of the United States Code, qui tam relators who
bring FCA suits against their employers are protected from retaliatory
actions. 164  Under this provision, employees who are "discharged,
demoted, suspended, threatened, harassed, or in any other manner
discriminated against" by their employer for bringing an FCA action are
entitled to reinstatement, two times their back pay plus interest, special
damages, attorneys fees and costs. 165  Whistleblower provisions are
important to ensure the cooperation of employees in reporting fraud upon
the government.' 66 Without such protections, and significant financial
incentives, whistleblowers would be unlikely to incur the significant
155. See id.
156. See id.
157. See Salcido, supra note 134, at 461.
158. See id.
159. See 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a) (2000).
160. See Salcido, supra note 134, at 461 ("In 1986, outraged by scandals plaguing the
Department of Defense, Congress revamped the FCA by expanding the scope of its intent
standard from requiring that defendants have a specific intent to defraud the government
to only requiring that defendants act recklessly or in deliberate ignorance of the truth or
falsity of the information.").
161. See id.
162. See Catherine L. Razzano, Vermont Agency of Natural Resources: Has the High
Court Sounded the Death Knell for Qui Tam Litigation, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL'Y 543, 548 (2002).
163. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(h).
164. Id.
165. Id.
166. See Bucy, supra note 27, at 948.
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costs of reporting wrongdoing. 
167
The procedures for qui tam suits were also clarified and streamlined
under the 1986 amendments to the FCA. 168 A qui tam relator initially
files his complaint under seal and in camera. 69 The relator then serves
the government with his complaint alleging an FCA violation and
discloses to the government all material evidence relating to the
violation. 7 ° The government then has sixty days in which to investigate
the allegations and decide whether to intervene in the action.' 71 During
the sixty-day period the defendant is unaware of the lawsuit. 172 If the
government declines to intervene, the qui tam relator may proceed with
the case on his own. 73 The government intervenes in relatively few qui
tam cases.174 Less than twenty-five percent of qui tam suits filed result in
governmental intervention. 75  When the government chooses not to
intervene in a qui tam suit, it has the ability to seek dismissal of the suit
even if the relator objects to such dismissal. 76 If the suit is dismissed, a
qui tam relator must absorb the attorneys' fees and costs incurred in
pursuing the litigation. 77 However, despite the low percentage of cases
in which the government intervenes, governmental dismissal of a qui tam
suit is not a major concern for most qui tam plaintiffs. This is because
the federal government rarely seeks dismissal of a qui tam suit in which
it declined to intervene, 178 regardless of the merit of a particular qui tam
action. 79  The reasons for this are clear: if the qui tam case is
unsuccessful, the government incurs no cost because it was not a
participant in the case; 180 and, if the qui tam case is successful, the
167. See id. ("If the regulatory world wants information from insiders about complex,
concealed wrongdoing motivated by economic gain, it must realize that information of
this caliber from this type of whistleblower is expensive. If the regulatory world is not
willing to pay for such information, it will not get it").
168. See 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730.
169. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
170. See id.
171. See id. Should the government decide to intervene, it will take over the
litigation, allowing the qui tam relator minimal input on the execution of the litigation.
But see Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 265 ("Qui tam relators can call into play the full
panoply of false claims sanctions, and they can object to settlements reached by the
government.").
172. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2).
173. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(4)(B).
174. See Donald H. Caldwell, Jr., Qui Tam Actions: Best Practices for Relator's
Counsel, 38 J. HEALTH L. 367, 385 (2005).
175. See id. (noting that "in recent years [the government] intervened in only
approximately 20 to 25% of [qui tam] cases").
176. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2).
177. Frieden, supra note 133, at 1051-52.
178. See Caldwell, supra note 174, at 377.
179. See id.
180. See id.
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government stands to gain substantial benefit from the penalties
imposed.1 81  Thus, the government rarely exercises its prosecutorial
discretion by seeking dismissal of qui tam cases.
82
C. Settlement of FCA Actions
All of the above factors contribute to a high rate of settlement in
FCA cases.1 83 Because of the significant penalties available under the
FCA, defendants are encouraged to settle cases rather than take the risk
and incur the litigation costs of proceeding to trial. 184 In addition, the
lowered intent requirement makes it easier for plaintiffs to prove FCA
violations, making it more likely that a defendant will seek to settle an
action prior to trial. Further, because FCA actions necessarily involve
defendants who do business with the federal government, protecting the
reputation of the defendant is often of great concern. Thus, defendants
may seek to settle even weak cases prior to trial if the reputational harm
of going to trial would outweigh the cost of settlement.
Settlement of qui tam cases under the FCA is not as straightforward
as settlement of other civil actions. Complications arise in the settlement
of qui tam actions because the interests of the qui tam relator and the
government do not always coincide. 8 5 A circuit split concerning the role
of the government in qui tam settlements further complicates settlement
procedure under the FCA.
186
The qui tam relator and the government have different motivations
and different interests in the outcome of FCA actions. 87 The qui tam
relator, while suing on behalf of the federal government, is motivated by
the prospect of monetary gain. 188 The FCA is designed to provide the
relator with significant financial benefit should he succeed in his action
through trial or settlement. 189 Nothing in the FCA provides an incentive
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See Kaz Kikkawa, Medicare Fraud and Abuse and Qui Tam: The Dynamic Duo
or the Odd Couple?, 8 HEALTH MATRIX 83, 122 (1998).
184. See id.
185. See Boese & Mclain, supra note 130, at 10 (noting that "[t]he existing regulatory
and FCA enforcement environment... pits providers against private citizens using the
FCA to pursue their own economic self-interest, an interest that may be, but often is not,
in the public interest").
186. Gretchen L. Forney, Qui Tam Suits: Defining the Rights and Roles of the
Government and the Relator Under the False Claims Act, 82 MINN. L. REV. 1357, 1374-
77 (1998).
187. See id.
188. See Beck, supra note 112, at 614-15.
189. See id. at 611 (explaining that "because a reward is given only for a successful
prosecution and never for refraining from filing an action, the [qui tam] statute
encourages the informer to ignore any consideration apart from whether a prosecution
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for a relator to seek anything other than monetary reward.' 90 On the
other hand, the government in an FCA suit seeks to benefit the public by
preventing fraud and recuperating losses for fraud sustained without
imposing excessive costs on society.' 9' The congressional purpose in
enacting the FCA was to prevent fraud on the federal government and
recoup damages caused by such fraud, not to provide significant
financial benefits to a select group of individuals. 92 Thus, settlement of
qui tam suits under the FCA can be difficult because of the wide gap
between the motivations and goals of the qui tam plaintiff and the
motivations and goals of the government.
The different goals of the qui tam relator and the government in
FCA actions can also result in problems with structured settlements,
where a qui tam plaintiff seeks to negotiate settlement terms which
would benefit the relator more than the government. 93 In a structured
settlement, a qui tam plaintiff and a defendant may agree to allocate a
larger portion of the damages to claims other than the FCA claim,
ensuring a larger recovery for the relator. 94 Thus, if a plaintiff sues a
defendant for both an FCA violation and for wrongful termination, a
structured settlement between the plaintiff and defendant may assign
90% of the damages to the wrongful discharge claim and only 10% of
the damages to the FCA claim. Because a qui tam plaintiff will only
receive 15-30% of the FCA damages and 100% of the damages for the
wrongful termination claim, such structured settlements benefit qui tam
relators, but work to the public's detriment.
Settlement of qui tam actions under the FCA is less complicated if
the government has intervened in the action and seeks to settle the case.
If the government decides to intervene in a qui tam action under the
FCA, it has the "primary responsibility for prosecuting the action."' 
95
Thus, under the FCA, the government can seek dismissal of the qui tam
suit, despite objection by the qui tam relator, provided the relator has an
opportunity to be heard in court.' 96 Likewise, the FCA provides that the
government can settle a qui tam action over the objection of a qui tam
will result in a monetary recovery.").
190. See id. at 614-15 (noting that "a qui tam statute intentionally turns prosecutorial
decision-making into a mercenary endeavor by purposefully inserting personal financial
concerns into a process that we normally seek to keep free from such complicating
influences."); see also Bucy, supra note 78, at 64 (noting that "private justice plaintiffs
have every incentive to push theories of liability as far as possible").
191. Beck, supra note 112, at 609.
192. Id.
193. Forney, supra note 186, at 1359.
194. Id.
195. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(1) (2000).
196. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(A).
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relator "if the court determines, after a hearing, that the proposed
settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the
circumstances."'197 Therefore, in qui tam cases in which the government
has intervened, the settlement of the case is directed by the government,
and the qui tam relator, although able to object, has little control over the
ultimate agreement.
Settlement of FCA qui tam suits is more complicated in cases where
the government declines to intervene in the qui tam suit, but objects to
the terms of the settlement agreed upon by the defendant and the qui tam
relator. The Fifth, Sixth and Tenth Circuits have held that the
government can choose not to intervene in a qui tam suit but still reject
the terms of a proposed settlement between the qui tam relator and the
defendant. 198 The Ninth Circuit has held that if the government chooses
not to intervene in a qui tam suit it does not have the absolute right to
prevent the qui tam plaintiff and the defendant from settling.'
99
In Searcy v. Philips Electronics North America Corp. ,200 the Fifth
Circuit held that the language of the FCA clearly grants the government
absolute power to veto settlements in FCA actions.20  The Searcy court
relied on a provision of the FCA which states that an FCA suit "may be
dismissed only if the court and the Attorney General give written consent
to the dismissal and their reasons for consenting., 20 2 Discussing this
provision, the court noted that the statute is "unambiguous in its
declaration that courts may not grant a voluntary dismissal in a FCA suit
unless the U.S. Attorney General consents to the dismissal. 20 3 Thus,
under the Searcy ruling, even if the federal government takes no part in
the litigation of an FCA claim it can still reject the ultimate settlement
agreement should the agreement not contain terms that meet the
197. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
198. Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co., 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2005); United States v.
Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 2000); Searcy v. Philips Elecs. N. Am.
Corp., 117 F.3d 154, 159-60 (5th Cir. 1997).
199. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994).
200. 117 F.3d 154 (5th Cir. 1997).
201. Id. at 159-60. Searcy involved a qui tam relator who filed suit against his
employer, Philips Electronics, for violations of the FCA. Id. at 155. The government
declined to intervene in the case, and the relator and defendant agreed to settle the suit for
$1 million dollars. Id. Under the qui tam provisions of the FCA, the relator would
receive 30% of the settlement, plus attorneys' fees and costs. Id. The settlement also
purported to release the defendant from "all claims and counterclaims asserted in any
pleading or other filing" in the case. Id. The government objected to this general release
and asserted a right to veto the settlement. Id. The trial court overruled the government's
objection, but the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FCA allows the
government to veto voluntary settlements between relators and defendants. Id. at 155,
158.
202. Id. at 158 (citing 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(1)).
203. Searcy, 117 F.3dat 155.
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government's approval. The Sixth and Tenth Circuits followed the
reasoning of Searcy and agreed that the FCA allows the government veto
power over qui tam settlements in all cases, including those in which the
204government does not intervene.
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit determined that the FCA does not
grant the government an absolute right to veto settlements in cases in
which it declines to intervene. °5 In Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp.,Z°6
the court rejected the government's argument that it has an absolute right
to block a qui tam settlement, holding that the FCA only permits
government intervention in the litigation after the initial sixty day period
"upon a showing of good cause. 2 °7  The Ninth Circuit discussed the
provision of the FCA requiring written consent of the Attorney General
for dismissal of qui tam suits and held that the provision is limited in its
application.0 8 In reviewing the text of the statute, the court determined
that written consent for dismissal is only required during the sixty-day
period in which the government has the right to intervene. 20 9 After the
government declines to intervene, the court held that good cause must be
shown in order for the government to reject the terms of a settlement
between the qui tam relator and the defendant.2 10  Thus, under the
Killingsworth line of reasoning, a qui tam relator suing on behalf of the
federal government has significant control over the terms of a settlement
between him and the defendant in FCA cases in which the government
does not intervene. In light of the significant penalties available under
the FCA, the great pressure on defendants to settle cases, and the fact
204. See United States v. Health Possibilities, P.S.C., 207 F.3d 335 (6th Cir. 2000);
Ridenour v. Kaiser-Hill Co. 397 F.3d 925 (10th Cir. 2005).
205. Killingsworth v. Northrop Corp., 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994). Killingsworth
was a former employee of the defendant, Northrop Corporation. Id. at 718.
Killingsworth filed suit as a qui tam relator against Northrop under the FCA, alleging that
Northrop submitted inflated estimates to the federal government in missile contract
proposals. Id. The government declined to intervene in the case. Id. After the case
failed to settle, Killingsworth amended his complaint to include a claim of wrongful
termination. Id. The relator and defendant subsequently agreed to settle the case for $4.2
million, allocating $1 million to the FCA claim and $3.2 million to the wrongful
termination claim. Id. The government objected to the terms of the settlement, and
sought to prevent dismissal of the action. Id. The district court dismissed the case over
the government's objection. Id. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the
government does not have an absolute right to veto a settlement agreement agreed to by a
qui tam relator and a defendant. Id. at 723. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit looked to the
legislative history of the FCA and also to the text of the statute itself. Id. at 721-22. The
circuit court held that the government could seek to dismiss an action after declining to
intervene, but only upon a showing of good cause. Id. at 723.
206. 25 F.3d 715 (9th Cir. 1994).
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that the federal government declines to intervene in the vast majority of
qui tam cases, the Killingsworth interpretation of the FCA is a huge boon
to qui tam plaintiffs seeking financial gain from FCA suits.
D. Current Litigation Under the FCA: Use of Qui Tam Actions in the
Health Care Context
As discussed previously, the FCA was initially enacted during the
Civil War to address fraudulent claims submitted by defense contractors
to the federal government. 21 Throughout much of its history, the FCA
has been utilized primarily in the context of the defense industry, seeking
212deterrence of and compensation for overbilling by defense contractors.
Since the 1986 amendments to the statute, however, the FCA has become
primarily a litigative tool to root out fraud in the health care industry.2 13
The health care industry relies, in large part, on government funds
to reimburse it for services rendered. Medicare and Medicaid comprised
approximately one third of health care funding in the United States in
2004.214 Every time a health care provider submits a claim for
reimbursement to these federally funded programs, it risks violating the
provisions of the FCA.215 A variety of behavior engaged in by health
care providers constitutes fraud and is routinely the subject of FCA
216actions. 6 The penalty provisions of the FCA are particularly severe for
the health care industry because of the large number of claims any given
health care provider submits for reimbursement and the variety of entities
subject to FCA actions.21 7 "Each separate bill, voucher, or other 'false
payment demand' constitutes a separate claim" under the FCA.2 8 Thus,
"a doctor who completes separate Medicare claims for each patient
treated will be liable for a forfeiture for each such form that contains
false entries even though several such forms may be submitted to the
211. See discussion infra Part III.A.
212. See Caldwell, supra note 174, at 368.
213. See Salcido, supra note 134, at 462-63. Qui tam plaintiffs quickly realized the
potential benefits associated with qui tam suits against health care providers under the
FCA. In 1992, only eighteen health care related qui tam actions were brought. Id. at 463.
In 1998, 288 health care related qui tam actions were brought. Id.
214. See The Nation's Health Dollar, Calendar Year 2004: Where It Came From,
http://www.cms.hhs.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/downloads/PieChartSourcesExpend
itures2004.pdf.
215. Salcido, supra note 134, at 462.
216. For a discussion of current health care initiatives under the FCA, see id. at 465-
85.
217. See id. at 458. "Every sector of the health care industry-hospitals, fiscal
agents, peer review organizations, physicians, researchers, laboratories, home health
agencies, long-term care facilities, suppliers, billing services, and others-has been the
target of an FCA action." Id.
218. S. Rep. No. 99-345, at 10 (cited in Salcido, supra note 134, at 462).
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fiscal intermediary at one time. '21 9 Consequently, significant awards are
available in FCA qui tam suits against health care providers. Of the $4
billion awarded in FCA qui tam actions as of 2001, $2.3 billion was
recovered from suits involving the health care industry.22 °
FCA actions relating to health care fraud often end in settlement.22'
The reasons for this are not merely the harsh financial penalties imposed,
but also relate to the most significant penalty available to the government
in the litigation of these cases: the ability of the government to exclude a
health care provider from Medicare.222 With much of a health care
provider's business dependent on Medicare reimbursement,22 3  the
exclusion of a provider from such a program could cause financial ruin
for that provider. Thus, it is nearly inevitable that a health care provider
accused of wrongdoing will settle a civil or criminal suit, because the
risks involved in proceeding to trial are far too high and may jeopardize
the provider's very existence.224
The increased use of qui tam actions in the health care context and
the resultant large recoveries have encouraged scholars and practitioners
to consider the use of qui tam actions in other contexts. Environmental
law scholars have argued for the adoption of qui tam provisions in
environmental protection statutes, noting the lack of incentive for
plaintiffs to bring citizen suits.2 25  Scholars have also argued for the
adoption of qui tam provisions in civil rights statutes, in order to prevent
and deter violations of those statutes by law enforcement officers. 26
The FCA itself could be the basis for qui tam suits in areas outside
219. Id.
220. See Salcido, supra note 134, at 463 (citing JACK A. MEYER & STEPHANIE E.
ANTHONY, REDUCING HEALTH CARE FRAUD: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF THE
FALSE CLAIMS ACT 38 (Sept. 2001)).
221. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 310.
222. See Stacy L. Brainin, Health Care: A Unique Criminal and Civil Enforcement
Environment, 45 S. TEX. L. REv. 131, 132 (2003) ("Perhaps the most devastating civil
sanction of all is an administrative sanction---exclusion from Medicare.").
223. Stuart M. Gerson & Jennifer E. Gladieux, Advice of Counsel: Eroding
Confidentiality in Federal Health Care Law, 51 ALA. L. REv. 163, 165-66 (1999).
"Inasmuch as the federal government is the payer of about 40% of the health care dollars
spent annually in the United States, no provider of any significance can afford not to
participate in federally funded programs such as Medicare and Medicaid." Id. at 171.
224. See Joan H. Krause, A Patient-Centered Approach to Health Care Fraud
Recovery, 96 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 579, 599 (2006); see also FABRIKANT ET AL. ,
supra note 17, at § 9.05 ("In exchange for a provider agreeing to operate under a
[Corporate Integrity Agreement], the [Office of Inspector General] generally agrees not
to exclude the provider from participation in Medicare, Medicaid, and other health care
programs.").
225. See Catherine T. Struve, The FDA and the Tort System: Postmarketing
Surveillance, Compensation and the Role of Litigation, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL'Y, L. &
ETHICS 587, 621 n. 152 (2005).
226. See Gilles, supra note 107, at 1424.
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of the health care and defense industries.227 In the aftermath of
Hurricane Katrina, the media focused significant attention on the
submission of fraudulent claims to the Federal Emergency Management
Agency ("FEMA"). a28 Under the terms of the FCA, any individual who
knowingly submits a false claim to the government violates the Act.229
Thus, those who submitted claims for FEMA money following the storm
and misused the funds provided could be subject to a qui tam suit under
the FCA. Further, contractors who provided inflated estimates to FEMA
for trailers or repair work are subject to the terms of the FCA. Moreover,
insurance agencies that falsely claimed home damage was covered under
federal flood insurance, instead of the wind and rain damage provisions
of a private insurance policy, may have violated the FCA.
Thus, the expanded use of the FCA has had an enormous economic
impact on the health care industry and may have considerable economic
effects on other industries.230 But the use of qui tam actions under the
FCA also reflects an overlap of criminal and civil law. This blurring of
distinctions, compounded with the overlap of criminal and civil liability
when addressing the wrongful actions of corporations, creates a system
in which there is little relevant difference between criminal and civil law.
IV. The Blurring of Distinctions Between Criminal and Civil Law for
Corporate Defendants
Perhaps nowhere is the blurring of criminal and civil liability seen
more clearly than when examining suits against corporate entities. A
corporation can commit a criminal act through the actions of its
employees,. 231 Thus, a corporation can be tried, convicted and punished
much like an individual.232 Although the United States has a long history
of imposing criminal liability on corporations, the number of criminal
227. See id. at 1423.
228. Audits: Millions of Dollars in Katrina Aid Wasted, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/
id/1 1326973/ (last visited August 29, 2006); Kevin Krolicki, Prosecutors Crack Down on
Katrina Fraud-Billions Maybe Wasted or Stolen-FEMA Overpays $174 Mil,
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/1506315/posts (last visited Aug. 29, 2006);
FEMA Warns of Fraudulent Practices in Aftermath of Katrina, http://www.fema.gov/
news/newsrelease.fema?id= 18739 (last visited Aug. 29, 2006).
229. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1) (2000).
230. See Joan H. Krause, Regulating, Guiding, and Enforcing Health Care Fraud, 60
N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 241, 242 (2004).
231. Because a corporation can only act through its agents, criminal liability can only
be imposed on a corporation if its agents meet certain requirements. Khanna, supra note
8, at 1489-90. In order to impose criminal liability on a corporation, an agent of the
corporation must have committed an illegal act with the appropriate mens rea, the agent
must have committed this act within the scope of his employment and the agent must
have intended some benefit to the corporation with his action. Id.
232. See id. at 1488-90.
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statutes directed at corporate wrongdoing has increased dramatically in
recent years. 3
Traditional distinctions between corporate criminal and civil
liability have diminished as the number of statutes imposing liability on
corporations and the number of agencies enforcing those statutes have
increased. 4  While many distinctions between criminal and civil law
remain as they relate to individuals, in the corporate context, civil and
criminal liability are not significantly different.235  Distinctions that
traditionally set criminal law apart from civil law, such as heightened
enforcement mechanisms, harsher penalties and moral condemnation,23 6
do not have the same applicability in the context of corporate liability, 37
particularly when discussing qui tam actions under the FCA.
As discussed previously, the use of qui tam suits in civil actions
under the FCA has created an enforcement mechanism greater in
resources and potential prosecutors than any governmental criminal
enforcement body.238 Thus, the FCA has a greater enforcement power
than that available in most criminal actions.
While moral distinctions between criminal and civil law begin to
dissolve when a corporation commits wrongdoing, there still remains a
stigma associated with criminal liability that is not attributed to
defendants in civil actions. 239 However, the stigma associated with
corporations convicted of a criminal act is much less severe than that
connected to individuals who have committed a criminal act.240
Corporations are not capable of emotion and, therefore, cannot feel the
shame associated with criminal conviction.241 Thus, the only way in
which the stigma of a criminal conviction affects a corporation is through
the reputational harm that such stigma will have on the corporation's
242business. Therefore, reputational harm is only relevant to a
corporation when that harm actually impacts the corporation's customer
base.243  Reputational harm can result from both criminal and civil
233. See id. at 1477.
234. See Lynch, supra note 7, at 33-34.
235. Ramirez, supra note 10, at 943.
236. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1492, 1497 ("The arguably unique sanctioning
characteristic of criminal liability is the criminal sanction's potentially stigmatizing
effect.").
237. See id. at 1492.
238. See discussion supra Part IIB.
239. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1499.
240. See id. at 1500.
241. Ramirez, supra note 10, at 938.
242. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1500.
243. See id. (noting that when "activities that harm third parties, such as
environmental pollution, do not directly affect a firm's customers, the firm will be
unlikely to suffer a reputational loss for engaging in those activities").
PENN STATE LAW REVIEW
actions and some scholars have argued that the difference between the
harm resulting from each type of liability is negligible.244 Thus, the idea
of moral condemnation as a unique characteristic of criminal law
weakens as it relates to the liability of corporate entities. Further, it is
arguable that associating such stigma with corporations only weakens the
condemnation associated with criminal penalties against non-corporate
actors.245
A further distinction between criminal and civil law is the type of
penalty that can be imposed in each proceeding. As discussed in Part I
of this Article, criminal sanctions are traditionally harsher than civil
sanctions and, unlike civil sanctions, allow for restrictions on liberty.246
As with other differences between criminal and civil law, this distinction
247diminishes when examining the liability of corporations. Unlike an
individual, a corporation cannot be imprisoned.248  However, other
penalties imposed in criminal prosecutions are available in the
prosecution of offending corporations. For example, corporations can be
fined, ordered to perform community service-or provide restitution, or
placed on probation. 249 Notably, these sanctions do not vary from the
sanctions imposed in civil proceedings against corporations.250 Indeed,
the penalties imposed on corporations under the FCA are essentially
identical to those imposed on corporations in criminal actions. In
addition to fines, corporate compliance programs are often imposed as
part of the penalty in an FCA action. 251 These compliance programs are
essentially a means to restrict the liberty of a corporation. Thus, the
imposition of compliance programs under the FCA is an additional way
in which the line between criminal and civil liability is obscured.
244. See id. at 1508-09 (citing Michael K. Block, Optimal Penalties, Criminal Law
and the Control of Corporate Behavior, 71 B.U. L. REV. 395, 414-15 (1991)).
245. See Khanna, supra note 8, at 1531 ("[C]itizens might find imposing criminal
liability on fictional entities farcical, and this response may decrease the criminal label's
effect for other types of crimes.").
246. See discussion supra p.7.
247. See Ramirez, supra note 10, at 937, 949.
248. Id. at 938.
249. Id. at 943-44.
250. Developments in the Law-Corporate Crime: Regulating Corporate Behavior
Through Criminal Sanction, Section V. The Choice Between Civil and Criminal
Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1300, 1311 (1979) (noting that "the added procedural
safeguards in criminal cases make criminal charges against corporations an unpopular
choice among enforcement officials when the same penalty can be attained more easily
through civil suit").
251. Karen Boxer & Helaine Gregory, Compliance is Good for Your Corporate
Health, 1178 PLI/CoRP. 387, 418 (2000).
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V. The Imposition of Corporate Integrity Agreements Under the FCA
A. Corporate Integrity Agreements as a Sanction in Criminal and Civil
Actions
Penalties imposed on corporations under the FCA often include
Corporate Integrity Agreements. Corporate Integrity Agreements
("CIAs") are agreements in which a corporation, accused of wrongdoing,
agrees to certain compliance standards in order to ensure that the
wrongdoing does not occur again.252 These agreements often result from
plea bargaining in criminal proceedings or settlement negotiations in
civil proceedings.253 CIAs may also be imposed by a judge following a
corporate conviction or the unfavorable outcome of a civil trial.254 CIAs
typically impose more stringent compliance standards upon a corporation
than the law mandates, often requiring the corporation to bear onerous
reporting and auditing costs. 255 CIAs also present problematic issues for
corporations who are obligated under the agreements to act in a manner
that may not serve the best interests of the corporation or its
shareholders.256
In 1991, the Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations
("Guidelines") went into effect.257 Under these new Guidelines, specific
sentencing ranges were mandated for corporations that were convicted of
criminal acts. 258 Because corporations are unable to serve sentences in
the same way that individuals are, different methods of supervision and
punishment were developed to account for the corporate wrongdoer.259
However, much like the Guidelines for individuals, the Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations specified a host of considerations which
would influence the severity of the sentence imposed on an
organization.26 °  One of these considerations is whether, prior to
sentencing, the corporation had in place a compliance program that could
discover and report criminal activity within the corporation.261  If the
corporation had such a system in place, the Guidelines authorized the
252. See Krause, supra note 230, at 255-56.
253. See id.
254. See, e.g. Ainslie, supra note 50, at 114.
255. See Naomi Ono, Boards of Directors Under Fire: An Examination of Nonprofit
Board Duties in the Health Care Environment, 7 ANNALS HEALTH L. 107, 128-29 (1998).
256. See Brainin, supra note 222, at 137-38.





261. See id. § 8C2.5(f).
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judge to reduce the sentence imposed upon the company.2 6' The
Guidelines further explained what constituted an effective compliance
program.
To develop an "effective" program, the organization must: establish,
communicate, monitor, and enforce compliance standards and
procedures for its employees and contractors; assign responsibility
for compliance to high-level personnel; not delegate authority to
individuals with a history of illegal behavior; and take appropriate
steps when the offense is detected. 
63
As a result of these Guidelines, corporations quickly realized the
benefits offered by corporate compliance programs.26 Such programs
could not only deter criminal activity within the corporation, but also
lessen the sentence imposed on the corporation if criminal activity
occurred.265
Beyond reducing the severity of a sentence, adopting a compliance
program prior to a criminal conviction might save the corporation from
having a court-imposed compliance program foisted upon it post-
conviction. The Sentencing Guidelines authorize government-mandated
compliance programs (memorialized in CIAs) that typically contain
onerous terms. 2 66 In addition to the strict terms of government-created
compliance programs, such programs also have the distinct disadvantage
of being created by persons outside of the organization. Corporate
officers and directors clearly believed that they were best suited to create
their own compliance programs that would effectively conform to the
structure and purpose of the company.
Although CIAs were originally utilized in corporate criminal cases,
the use of such agreements quickly spread to the civil administrative
domain.267 Administrative agencies will often investigate allegations of
corporate wrongdoing without referring the matter to the Justice
Department for criminal prosecution.268  Administrative agencies
frequently have the resources and expertise to more effectively address
262. See id.
263. Krause, supra note 230, at 255.
264. See Brainin, supra note 222, at 134.
265. Id. at 135. "The Federal Sentencing Guidelines unequivocally laud the benefits
of corporate compliance programs. Experience suggests however that true benefits under
the Guidelines are at many times illusory." Id at 134-35.
266. See U.S.S.G. ch. 8.
267. See Razzano, supra note 162, at 562 ("A descendant of the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, compliance programs are usually imposed by the Government in Corporate
Integrity Agreements, as part of settling healthcare fraud charges.").
268. See, e.g. A. Craig Eddy, The Effect of the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA) on Health Care Fraud in Montana, 61 MONT. L.
REv. 175, 184 (2000).
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corporate misdeeds through civil actions than local U.S. Attorneys'
Offices can through criminal prosecutions.26 9 Particularly in heavily
regulated industries, administrative agencies police corporations and use
civil litigation as a method of enforcing legal standards. 270 The power of
an administrative agency in such contexts is enormous because agencies
often have the ability to prevent a corporation from conducting business
by taking away its license or by prohibiting the government from
conducting business with the corporation.271 In this way, administrative
agencies can essentially impose a death sentence upon a business.
Thus, the pressure on a corporation to settle with an administrative
agency in the course of a civil action is extremely high and the terms of
the settlement are dictated by the agency. Consequently, CIAs have
become prevalent in the civil administrative context with agencies
imposing strict and onerous compliance requirements upon corporations
in the course of settlement.272  Further, the imposition of corporate
compliance programs has become more common in the settlement of
private civil litigation, with private individual litigants dictating the
management and compliance strategies of a particular corporation.273
Nowhere is this evolution of CIA use from criminal sentence to
administrative civil settlement to private civil settlement more apparent
than in the health care industry.
B. Use of CIAs in the Health Care Industry
In health care industry fraud cases, CIAs are routinely imposed in
settlement. 274 The prevalence of CIAs in the health care industry is far
from surprising. As a heavily regulated industry which relies
substantially on government funds, the power of the Department of
Health and Human Services ("HHS"), the administrative agency
269. See Alan Cohen, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1176 PLI/CoRP. 475, 491
(2000).
270. See Eddy, supra note 268, at 183.
271. For example, in an industry such as defense contracting, a business's inability to
contract with the government would destroy the business. Likewise, in the health care
industry, withholding federal Medicare funds from a particular provider would essentially
mean the end of that provider. See, e.g. Eddy, supra note 268, at 204 (noting that
"[e]xclusion from Medicare and Medicaid is the death knell for most health care
providers.").
272. See Cohen, supra note 269, at 491 (noting that "[i]n administrative actions
against regulated businesses, settlements increasingly include corporate integrity
agreements mandating specific elements of elaborate compliance programs.").
273. See Blickenstaff, supra note 20, at 16.
274. See Razzano, supra note 162, at 562 ("The Office of Inspector General ("OIG")
frequently requires that health care providers enter into Corporate Integrity Agreements
("CIAs") during settlement of health care fraud and abuse investigations.").
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overseeing the industry, is enormous."' Given this imbalance of power,
health care providers have little choice but to agree to CIAs containing
even the most onerous of terms in their settlement of suits.276  In
determining whether to impose a CIA, the HHS Office of Inspector
General ("OIG") considers many factors, such as:
I) whether the provider self-disclosed the alleged misconduct;
2) the monetary damage to the Federal health care programs;
3) whether the case involves successor liability;
4) whether the provider is still participating in the federal health care
programs or is in the line of business that gave rise to the fraudulent
conduct;
5) whether the alleged conduct is capable of repetition;
6) the age of the conduct;
7) whether the provider has an effective compliance program and
would agree to limited compliance or integrity measures and would
annually certify such compliance to the OIG; and
• 277
8) other circumstances, as appropriate.
Regardless of these enumerated considerations, however, CIAs are the
278rule, rather than the exception, in health care settlement agreements.
This is in part because, within a CIA, there is often a separate penalty for
violating the terms of the agreement itself, which helps guarantee
compliance with the CIA terms through contractual damages. 279 Further,
275. Nicole A. Berryman, et al., Health Care Fraud, 38 AM. CRiM. L. REV. 913, 966
(2001).
276. See Krause, supra note 230, at 255 ("Since the mid-1990s, it has become
standard practice for the government to require health care providers to enter into
corporate integrity agreements ("CIAs") as a condition of settlement; the provider agrees
to onerous compliance measures in return for OIG's agreement not to seek exclusion.").
277. Fabrikant et al., supra note 17 (citing Office of Inspector General, An Open
Letter to Health Care Providers (Nov. 20, 2001), available at http://oig.hhs.gov/fraud/
docs/openletters/openletter 111901 .htm.
278. See Krause, supra note 230, at 255.
279. See Paula J. Desio, The Regulatory Environment and the Organizational
Sentencing Guidelines, 1120 PLI/CoRP. 301 (1999); see also Lewis Morris & Gary W.
Thompson, Reflections on the Government's Stick and Carrot Approach to Fighting
Health Care Fraud, 51 ALA. L. REV. 319, 343 (1999) ("Under recent CIAs, providers are
subject to the imposition of specific monetary penalties (called stipulated penalties) for
failure to comply with the basic obligations under the agreement, for example, appointing
[Vol. 111:3
2007] THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 659
CIAs can impose more rigorous compliance standards upon a
corporation than the law itself does.28 ° CIAs "are rife with the
requirement that outside consultants be hired to audit and report on
compliance." 8' Indeed, the typical CIA not only requires the extensive
use of independent monitors and auditors, but also includes rigorous
measures of auditing and reporting to DHHS and self-disclosure of any
breach of CIA terms.2 82 In addition to these heavy substantive burdens
imposed by typical CIAs, the agreements usually provide that costs
associated with implementing the CIA's requirements may not be
reimbursed, even if they are related to patient care.2 83 Furthermore,
corporations operating under CIAs must strictly comply with the terms of
the agreement, or they will face penalties and fines greater than those
a compliance officer or developing policies and procedures.").
280. For example, the terms for the plea agreement for National Medical Enterprises
(NME):
This agreement requires, among other things, that NME submit to a yearly
audit by outside consultants of its billing procedures and Medicare "bad debt"
accounting procedures and semi-annual reviews of its acute care facilities'
admissions practices. The company must make annual reports of the results of
these audits available to [HHS]. Each employee must receive one hour of
training yearly on the requirements of the corporate integrity program, and
company managers are required to certify annually that employees have been
informed that compliance with the program is a condition of their employment.
NME is required to establish both a management committee with responsibility
to oversee compliance and an "Ethics and Quality Assurance" committee of the
Board of Directors to supervise the work of the management committee. And,
for five years following the execution of the agreement, NME must submit an
annual compliance report to designated government agencies.
Karla R. Spaulding, "An Ounce of Prevention is Worth a Pound of Cure": Federal
Sentencing Guidelines for Organizations, 42 FED. LAW. 35, 38-39 (1995) (noting that the
DOJ has "cited this onerous program as the model they will follow.., in future criminal
cases involving businesses").
In addition, the NME agreement required that "all payments to physicians be made
only pursuant to a contract that has been reviewed and approved by [outside] counsel...
and the opinion of counsel approving such contract shall be attached to the contract in the
files of NME and evidence of such approval made available to representatives of HHS
upon request." See Frank P. Fedor, The Advisory Opinion: Must You Ask in Due
Diligence?, 10 No. 1 HEALTH LAW. 19, 21-22 (1997).
281. See id. at2l.
282. See Brainin, supra note 222, at 137. "Under mandatory programs, much of the
monitoring and auditing must be performed by independent professionals or the
government itself. Additionally, often the agreements provide that the settling company
must allow HHS to examine its records and evaluate its compliance program. Finally,
mandatory programs require self-reporting of "material violations" and require annual
reporting to 01G." Id.
283. See Boxer & Gregory, supra note 251, at 450 n.7 (noting that "costs specifically
associated with the implementation of a corporate integrity agreement in response to a
Government investigation resulting in a civil or criminal judgment or settlement are
unallowable, and are also made specifically and expressly unallowable in corporate
integrity agreements and civil fraud settlements").
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they would face for merely violating the law.2 8 4
The imposition of corporate integrity programs is not limited to
direct criminal or administrative actions under the FCA, but also are
often part of qui tam settlements and judgments.2 85  Thus, the burdens
imposed by onerous corporate integrity programs are not restricted to the
discretion of the government, but may be the result of civil settlement
with private litigants. Because of the burdensome requirements of
corporate integrity programs, their imposition in settlement negotiations
(rather than by a court of law) and their use by private civil litigants, the
use of such agreements has resulted in a host of problems for
corporations.
C. Problems Associated with CIAs
The major problems associated with the use of CIAs relate to their
creation through settlement negotiations. Because tremendous pressure
is brought to bear on corporations that are the subject of investigations
relating to FCA violations, most of these suits are settled without the
involvement of a neutral judicial officer.286 This pressure leads to
unfavorable terms for the corporation, which the corporation has little
bargaining power to change.
Given the balance of power, it should come as no surprise that
prosecutors have the power to "encourage" settlements, even where
abstract legal analysis might favor the defendant.... These agencies
may demand, as a condition of settlement, that the provider comply
with requirements that are not otherwise imposed by law.... The
danger is that "the agency possesses the ability to impose its will on
the firm in ways which may not be authorized by the governing
statute, may not have been envisioned by the creators of the agency,
284. See Leonard C. Homer, If Successor Liability Under the Medicare Program is
Inevitable: Due Diligence Issues that May Be the Basis for False Claims Act and
Medicare Program Penalty Liability, 1129 PLI/CoRP. 55, 58 (1999) (noting that more
liability is imposed on hospitals that violate CIAs than is imposed on hospitals that
violate their own voluntary compliance programs).
285. See Louis M. Brown et al., The Legal Audit: Corporate Internal Investigation,
Appendix 43; HHS Compliance Program Guidance for Hospitals ("Corporate integrity
agreements are executed as part of a civil settlement between the health care provider and
the Government to resolve a case arising under the False Claims Act (FCA), including
the qui tam provisions of the FCA, based on allegations of health care fraud or abuse.").
286. See David A. Hyman, Health Care Fraud and Abuse: Market Change, Social
Norms, and the Trust "Reposed in the Workmen, " 30 J. LEGAL STUD. 531, 536 (2001)
(noting that because the stakes in FCA cases are so high "most defendants are under
extreme pressure to settle... [t]hus, the allegations of plaintiffs are almost never tested at
trial-a pattern that creates substantial opportunities for strategic behavior on the part of
those bringing FCA claims").
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and indeed may exceed the agency's formal powers."
287
Thus, the lack of judicial oversight regarding these agreements can result
in the de facto creation of legal standards by administrative agencies or
civil litigants. This practice amounts to legislation by an administrative
organization or a private party and can lead to industry-wide standards
that may never have been approved by the legislature. This is obviously
problematic in itself, but, in turn, this practice also creates several other
problems. First, because onerous and complicated terms are imposed
through litigation and the use of CIAs, the legislature never needs to
actually face the prospect of creating appropriate legislation and publicly
debating the standards that should apply.288 Further, while prosecutorial
and administrative guidelines may inform the CIA terms imposed by
settlements involving HHS or DOJ, private litigants operate under no
such restraints, imposing corporate compliance programs that are far
more burdensome than those which the government would wish.2 8 9 Not
only may terms imposed by private parties be more burdensome than
those which may be imposed by a governmental entity, but private
parties do not typically bring suit in furtherance of the public good.
Thus, private parties may bring suit against particular actors for offenses
that the government would not focus on because it is not in the best
interests of the public to pursue such claims.
With respect to most regulatory and criminal enforcement programs,
regulators and prosecutors have limited resources and some level of
political accountability. We could expect, therefore, that their efforts
would be focused on the most serious offenders. The FCA, however,
is subject to enforcement by not only public officials, but also by
private qui tam relators. Qui tam relators can call into play the full
panoply of false claims sanctions, and they can object to settlements
reached by the government. Providers, therefore, can put forth
plausible claims that they are unfairly vulnerable to the public and
287. See Krause supra note 230, at 276 (quoting Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of
Regulatory Enforcement and the Problem ofAdministrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J.
1275, at 1299-1300 (1998-99)).
288. See id. at 273-74 (noting that "an emphasis on enforcement-at the expense of
substantive regulation-may lull policymakers into a sense of complacency, where
difficult decisions are delayed in the hopes that the desired result will be achieved
through the litigation process.").
289. See Hyman, supra note 286, at 552. "Providers who believe they are blameless
are under tremendous pressure to settle because of the legal expenses associated with
mounting a defense and the high probability of bankruptcy and professional disgrace if
the jury does not see things the same way the provider does. Even if program
administrators are inclined to comply with the relational contract and overlook such
conduct, fraud control personnel and qui tam relators are not bound by that determination
and usually take a much harder line on the subject of regulatory compliance." Id.
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private abusive prosecution and coerced, extortionate settlements.
290
In exercising their discretion to enforce health care legislation,
prosecutors are required to consider basic policy reasons behind the laws
and tread the fine line between "protecting against improper financial
activities while at the same time encouraging the delivery of cost-
effective, high-quality medical innovations. 29' On the other hand,
"[w]hile prosecutorial discretion may be an imperfect means of
preventing overreaching in health care fraud cases, it seems preferable to
a bounty system enforced by private individuals who have no obligation
to further the government's health care agenda.', 292  Because private
litigation does not represent the interests of the industry and the public,
terms imposed by agreements with such parties may, in fact, be
detrimental to societal interests as well as harmful to relationships
between the administrative agency and the industry it oversees.
2 93
Another problem associated with the use of CIAs in the civil
context is the imposition of rigorous procedures on a company by
persons who lack understanding about the internal workings of the
company.294 A self-imposed compliance program that takes into account
the history, inner workings and structure of the corporation will be far
preferable to the corporation's management, employees and
shareholders.295 Conditions imposed by CIAs negotiated with the OIG,
however, may not necessarily be in the best interest of the corporation,
and can put crucial business determinations in the hands of parties who
are not in the best position to make such determinations. "Thus, these
agreements, once entered into, necessarily predetermine such crucial
judgments as when to conduct an internal investigation, how to define
the investigative team, and whether to agree in advance to self-report the
results. 296  Here the ability of private parties to impose corporate
integrity programs on corporations also plays an important role. While
"the OIG will grant more deference to the existing compliance measures
of a self-disclosing provider, even if those measures differ from what the
290. Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 265.
291. Krause, supra note 230, at 277 (noting that "prosecutors must take care not to
usurp the basic legislative task of defining prohibited public behavior").
292. Id. at 277-78.
293. See id. at 273 ("Private litigation, in particular, can interfere with necessary
regulation by diverting limited government resources, generating unfavorable legal
precedent, and damaging regulators' relationships with the industry.").
294. See Marcos D. Jimenez & Dana Foster, The Importance of Compliance
Programs for the Health Care Industry, 7 U. MIAMI Bus. L. REV. 503, 509 (1999).
295. See id. ("Voluntarily implementing a compliance program is preferable to
waiting for the OIG to impose a corporate integrity agreement.").
296. Brainin, supra note 222, at 137.
[Vol. 111:3
2007] THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 663
OIG might otherwise require in a corporate integrity agreement," 297 no
such deference is necessarily given by a private party negotiating a CIA.
Thus, CIAs can impose heavier burdens than are necessary for
preventing and detecting corporate misbehavior simply by virtue of the
fact that such agreements need not be created with the input of those
most familiar with the workings of the corporation.
A further problem associated with the use of CIAs in the health care
industry is the length of time for which they are effective. The typical
CIA is in force for three to five years.298 The compliance procedures
imposed by the CIA, therefore, do not change over that period of time,
regardless of industry or corporate changes. In an industry that evolves
as quickly as health care, stringent procedures that do not evolve with the
times can become more restricting as time passes.
A corporation's entry into a CIA can also expose the company to
additional civil and criminal liability. In United States v. Tenet
Healthcare Corp. ,299 the Department of Justice ("DOJ") brought an FCA
claim against Tenet.30 0  Among the allegations contained in the
complaint were separate assertions that Tenet breached the terms of its
CIA. 30 ' The DOJ further alleged that by falsely certifying it was in
compliance with the terms of the CIA, Tenet engaged in criminal
conduct.3 °2 In this way, the
DOJ backhandedly endorse[d] a new criminal theory that would
greatly expand corporate criminal liability for health care providers.
Section 1320a-7b has traditionally been used to attach criminal
liability to direct acts of health care fraud, i.e., where providers have
made direct false claims or statements to the United States or
engaged in otherwise prohibited activity, to obtain an undeserved
benefit.... Under DOJ's theory in Tenet, however, the corporation
would not be held criminally liable for direct acts of fraud but for the
failure to report itself when it learned of false or fraudulent claims.
30 3
297. W. Ferguson, 2000: Recent Legislation, Cases, and Other Developments
Affecting Health Care Providers and Integrated Delivery Systems, SF69 ALI-ABA 671,
695-96 (2001).
298. See Brown et al., supra note 285, at n.5.
299. United States v. Tenet Healthcare Corp., et al., No. 03-206 (C.D. Cal.).
300. See Andrew L. Hurst, Civil False Claims Act of 2003, 51-JAN FED. LAW. 26, 32
(2004).
301. See id. (noting that this "marks a significant departure from the prior practices of
DOJ and the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), in that they have
previously emphasized the use of corporate integrity agreements and self-reporting to
prevent fraud, not to punish it").
302. See id. at 33. (noting that these allegations, "(to the author's knowledge) have
never before been used by DOJ in an FCA matter").
303. See id. (explaining "[i]n other words, should the corporation be aware at any
time that any of its claims to the government were improper, it would be committing a
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Thus, while a corporation does not have much power to negotiate the
imposition or terms of a CIA, by entering into such an agreement it is
exposing itself to criminal penalties that corporations engaging in similar
conduct, but who are not operating under a CIA, are not exposed to. In
this way, administrative agencies are in effect creating new criminal
liability, not enacted by the legislature.
While exposing companies to potential future criminal sanctions,
CIAs do not protect corporations from civil litigation stemming from the
same factual scenario that gave rise to the imposition of the agreement.3 °4
Thus, disclosures made to the government under the mandatory terms of
a CIA can later be used against a corporation in litigation by private
parties. This information, as a result of its disclosure, loses any attorney-
client or work-product privilege and exposes the corporation to further
litigation, despite the fact that the corporation has agreed to rigorous
compliance measures under the CIA.30 5
The waiver of attorney-client privilege and the conflicted role of
compliance officers under CIA self-reporting obligations are major
problems presented by the use of these agreements in civil litigation.
The self-reporting requirements of CIAs are burdensome, requiring
corporations to hold nothing back from the OIG.3 °6
For example, in addition to a complete description of the violation,
complete identification of all persons involved and an explanation of
each one's role in the [illegal activity], the entity must identify all
corporate officials, employees, or agents who should have known, but
failed to detect, the incident or practice based on their job
responsibilities.
307
In providing this information, however, the provider must fully cooperate
with any investigation done by the OIG, allowing "access to all audit
work papers and other supporting documents without the assertion of
privileges or limitations. '" 30 8 And, as mentioned previously, this access
to information and waiver of privilege does not prevent the OIG from
later using the information obtained from an investigation against the
crime by not reporting this impropriety to the United States").
304. See Brainin, supra note 222, at 143 (noting that there is "no protection
whatsoever against spin-off litigation or against the possibility of waiver of the attorney-
client privilege or work product doctrine in subsequent civil litigation as a result of the
required disclosure to the government").
305. See id.
306. See Michael M. Mustokoff et al., To Disclose or Not To Disclose, There Should
Be No Question, 13 NO. 4 HEALTH LAW. 28, 32 (2001).
307. Id.
308. Id. (noting further that "the Inspector General nowhere suggests that voluntary
disclosure will result in immunity from prosecution or amnesty in any form").
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corporation in a criminal prosecution. 30 9 These reporting requirements
not only force a corporation to waive its privileges when it discovers any
violation has occurred, but it also places corporate compliance officers in
a difficult position.
Under CIA terms, corporate compliance officers have a duty to the
OIG to report any violations of the CIA, disregarding any duty they may
have to protect the company from financial harm. 310 This is not to say
that compliance officers operating without a CIA do not have a duty to
report illegal activity. Rather, compliance officers operating under a CIA
often do not have any choice as to the timing or manner by which such
reporting is done.31' Thus, "some complain that compliance officers
have been forced into roles akin to independent counsel within the
corporation, pledging their loyalty not to the corporation but to
government enforcement agencies. '312 This is complicated further by the
fact that compliance officers are not subject to the attorney-client
privilege. 313  Employees within a company may not hand over
information to a compliance officer as freely as they would to an internal
counsel, knowing that information given to internal counsel would be
protected under the privilege and information given to the compliance
officer would be necessarily handed over to the government. Thus, it is
uncertain whether the role of a compliance officer operating under a CIA
is as effective as that of an internal counsel in ferreting out illegal
activity.
As is apparent in the context of the health care industry, the use of
corporate integrity agreements in FCA actions results in a host of
problematic issues and can blur the lines between criminal enforcement,
administrative action and private suit. While the use of an onerous
agreement directing the structure and operation of a company may be
appropriate in criminal cases where judicial oversight exists, the
employment of a civil action to impose such terms on a corporation
seems to give too much power to the private litigant and, perhaps, the
administrative agency. Because of the imbalance of power created by
the severe penalties of the FCA, civil actions under this statute are often
settled, and the settlements almost always result in the imposition of a
corporate integrity program. The terms imposed by these agreements
and the fact that CIAs expose corporations to further civil and criminal
liability not mandated by statute seem to impinge on the role of the
legislature. Further, the fact that such measures can result from a private
309. See id.
310. See Jimenez & Foster, supra note 294, at 511.
311. See Brainin, supra note 222, at 137.
312. See Jiminez & Foster, supra note 294, at 511.
313. See id.
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civil suit, where the plaintiff has no obligation to consider governmental
or societal policy concerns is troubling, to say the least. From these
facts, it is clear that the use of CIAs in the health care context can be
extremely burdensome on a corporation. The use of CIAs is also
spreading to other heavily regulated industries who are also facing the
same, strong incentives to settle and comply with the onerous settlement
terms of CIAs.3 14
D. Use of CIAs Outside of the Health Care Context
It is not surprising that the use of devices similar to corporate
integrity agreements extends to industries beyond the health care context.
As noted previously, CIAs have their origins in the Sentencing
Guidelines for Organizations, and these guidelines are certainly not
limited to organizations involved in the health care industry. Just as a
health care corporation may enter into a CIA to avoid harsher sentencing,
so might any other corporation that is charged with illegal activity. The
evolution of CIA use from a criminal penalty to a civil settlement term
has happened in other heavily regulated industries where pressure to
settle cases is extremely high. "In administrative actions against
regulated businesses, settlements increasingly include corporate integrity
agreements mandating specific elements of elaborate compliance
programs. '31 5  Specifically, the Securities and Exchange Commission
("SEC") has utilized agreements in securities litigation with terms
similar to those imposed by CIAs in the health care context.
For example, in the WorldCom settlement with the SEC,
WorldCom agreed to the institution of a permanent injunction which
required the corporation take affirmative action by putting in place
specific compliance measures.
The Permanent Injunction ... imposed several novel and far-reaching
forms of affirmative relief. This relief included requiring (i) a
company-wide program of training in accounting, financial disclosure
and ethics, (ii) a comprehensive review of the Company's system of
internal controls, and (iii) a review of the Company's corporate
governance "systems, policies, plans and practices" to recommend
314. See discussion infra Part V.D.
315. Alan Cohen, Conducting Due Diligence 2000: Foreign Corrupt Practices Act,
1176 PLI/CORP. 475, 491 (2000); see also Bruce A. Hiler & Ira H. Raphaelson, When
Reasonable Reliance Isn 't Enough: The Evolving Standards for Board Oversight, 12
INSIGHTS 2, at 6 (1998) (noting that in administrative actions against regulated businesses,
settlements include corporate integrity agreements that provide for specific compliance
programs).
[Vol. 111:3
2007] THE FALSE CLAIMS ACT AND CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY 667
changes for the future.
316
The permanent injunction agreed to by WorldCom was created by a
Corporate Monitor, who was given broad discretion and authority to
implement changes within the company.317 "Few if any companies have
ever been subject to such wide-ranging internal oversight imposed from
without. ,,318 Unlike CIAs imposed in many health care settlements,
however, the permanent injunction in the WorldCom administrative
action was subject to court oversight.31 9 In addition, should any terms of
the agreement become too onerous, the corporation was expressly
permitted to appeal to the judgment of the court.
320
The imposition of Corporate Integrity Agreements, a sanction
originally available as a penalty in criminal prosecutions, is problematic
when utilized as a penalty in civil actions. Such agreements subject
corporations to expanded liability and onerous terms that may not be in
the best interests of the company's shareholders, the industry, or the
public. 32' The problems associated with corporate integrity programs are
magnified, however, when they result from private litigation in qui tam
actions under the FCA.32 2 Lack of governmental oversight in qui tam
litigation and the ability of a qui tam plaintiff to independently settle
actions with defendants can lead to the imposition of integrity programs
which do little to serve the interest of the public, creating precedent that
is harmful to the industry.
316. Richard C. Breeden, Restoring Trust: Report to the Hon. Jed S. Rakoff on
Corporate Governance for the Future of MCI, SK034 ALI-ABA 761, 777-78 (2003).




Similarly, in a joint settlement with the U.S. Attorney's Office and the SEC for
Anti-Trust violations, Computer Associates agreed to implement affirmative compliance
measures within the corporation. Among the terms of the settlement, Computer
Associates agreed to:
[f]orward looking remedial relief, including, for at least 18 months, that
Computer Associates will be subject to the review of an Independent Examiner,
reporting to the SEC, the Justice Department and Computer Associates' Board
of Directors. Also, Computer Associates will establish a comprehensive new
ethics and compliance program, overseen by a new Chief Compliance Officer,
and a new Compliance Committee of its Board of Directors.
SEC Press Release No. 2004-134, SEC Files Securities Fraud Charges Against
Computer Associates International, Inc., Former CEO Sanjay Kumar, and Two Other
Former Company Executives (Sept. 22, 2004), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/
press/2004-134.htm.
321. See discussion supra Part V.C.
322. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 265.
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VI. Qui Tam Actions Under the FCA: Problems Inherent in the
Overlap Between Criminal and Civil Law
Qui tam actions under the FCA demonstrate a near-complete
overlap of criminal and civil law.323 The parties and remedies in a civil
action against a corporation under the qui tam provisions of the FCA blur
the line between criminal and civil law, resulting in a problematic system
of governance in which criminal acts and penalties are indistinguishable
from civil wrongs and remedies.324 However, while the parties and
penalties available in FCA civil actions against corporations make such
actions nearly indistinguishable from criminal cases, the procedures and
governmental discretion required in criminal cases to protect defendants
are not available in civil FCA cases.325 Consequently, defendants in qui
tam actions are subjected to the same penalties as defendants in criminal
cases but they are not afforded the procedural protections of the criminal
law, nor are they able to rely on prosecutorial discretion to ensure fair
adjudication of the action. Therefore, the blurring of criminal and civil
distinctions under the FCA is problematic because a defendant
corporation is subjected to all of the burdens and none of the protections
available in a criminal proceeding.
A. Procedural Problems Presented by Qui Tam Litigation Under the
FCA
As discussed in Part I of this Article, a number of procedural
protections guard the rights of defendants in criminal proceedings. Yet,
despite the fact that the United States Supreme Court has held the FCA
to be punitive in purpose, none of these procedural protections attach to
actions under the statute.326 Indeed, this is the very reason why the FCA
is attractive to governmental and private litigants. Procedural protections
afforded in criminal actions raise the cost of litigation for the government
and lessen the likelihood of success.327 By seeking to remedy public
wrongs through civil litigation, rather than through criminal actions,
plaintiffs avoid these costly procedural protections328 and enhance their
chances of winning the case at trial, or forcing settlement.
A significant difference between the safeguards for the rights of
323. See discussion supra Part III.
324. See discussion supra Part III-IV.
325. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 248; Beck, supra note 112, at 610-11.
326. See Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States, 529 U.S. 765, 784-
85 (2000) (noting that "the current version of the FCA imposes damages that are
essentially punitive in nature"); see also Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 248.
327. See Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 248; see also Mann, supra note 1, at 1798.
328. Id. at 248.
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defendants in criminal trials and those available in civil actions is the
burden of proof. In criminal trials the state must prove all material
elements of a criminal statute beyond a reasonable doubt.329  In civil
actions, on the other hand, plaintiffs are only charged with proving the
satisfaction of a statute's elements by a preponderance of the evidence.3 30
Prior to the 1986 amendments to the FCA, Congress required a clear and
convincing standard of proof, which is higher than that of most civil
actions, but not as onerous as the criminal standard.33 ' Concerned that
such a standard was being interpreted by courts as a quasi-criminal
burden of proof and was lowering the number and success rate of FCA
actions filed, Congress lowered the burden to that of a typical civil
action.332 Therefore, although the penalties and purpose of the FCA may
be the same as a criminal statute, a plaintiff seeking relief under the FCA
has only to meet a relatively weak standard of proof.
333
The justification for requiring a heavy burden of proof in criminal
actions is that such a burden is necessary to protect the rights of criminal
defendants who face severe penalties if convicted.334  A criminal
defendant must be found guilty using this onerous standard in order to
ensure that he or she is not wrongfully convicted. It is a necessary result
of the criminal law that some guilty parties are acquitted in criminal
actions because of the high burden of proof. Yet this result is acceptable
because our society would rather have some guilty parties escape
conviction than have innocent parties endure the harsh penalties imposed
in criminal sanctions.33 5 However, in civil actions against corporations
under the FCA, the same remedies (fines, imposition of corporate
integrity programs, and exclusion from government-funded programs)
are available to plaintiffs that are available to the state in criminal
actions. Thus, it is unclear why the same concerns of wrongful
conviction do not apply in these actions to ensure that corporate
defendants under the FCA are not wrongly subjected to severe sanctions.
Further, it is clear that requiring the weaker burden of proof lessens
329. See United States v. Gainey, 380 U.S. 63, 79 (1965).
330. See id.
331. See Razzano, supra note 162, at 548.
332. See Eric S. Askanase, Qui Tam and the False Claims Act: Criminal Punishment
in Civil Disguise, 70 DEF. CouNs. J. 472, 483 (2003) (noting that this change in burden
occurred despite the fact that "[p]unitive damages have long been considered prime
candidates for consideration under a higher burden of proof').
333. See 31 U.S.C. § 373 1(c) (2000).
334. See Mann, supra note l, at 1811.
335. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 372 (1970) (Harlan, J., concurring). In a
discussion of the standard of proof required in criminal proceedings, Justice Harlan noted
that he "view[ed] the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal case
as bottomed on a fundamental value determination of our society that it is far worse to
convict an innocent man than to let a guilty man go free." Id.
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the financial burden on a party seeking a remedy under any given
statute.336 Thus, plaintiffs in FCA actions do not incur the same costs
that the government would in a criminal action seeking to prove a case of
fraud beyond a reasonable doubt. FCA plaintiffs are therefore more
likely to file suit and see it through to completion than they would if they
had a higher burden of proof. Consequently, there is great pressure on
defendants in FCA actions to settle suits with private parties.33 7 In sum,
even a qui tam plaintiff with a relatively weak case can pressure a
corporate defendant to settle because the elements of the statute need
only be proven by a preponderance of the evidence.
Double Jeopardy is another constitutional protection afforded
criminal defendants that does not protect defendants in actions under the
FCA. The double jeopardy clause ensures that a criminal defendant
cannot be tried twice for the same crime.338 Thus, once a criminal
defendant has been acquitted of certain criminal conduct, the state cannot
bring another criminal action based on the same conduct against the
same defendant. The Supreme Court has extended the double jeopardy
protections to cases in which the government brings a punitive civil
action against a defendant.339 If the defendant is convicted of a crime,
the government cannot later seek punitive civil sanctions for the same
conduct that was the basis for the criminal conviction. 340 The reverse is
also true, where the government cannot bring a criminal action against a
defendant against whom it previously sought punitive civil sanctions.3 41
In qui tam actions under the FCA, however, it is private parties who seek
the punitive civil sanctions, albeit on behalf of the government. Thus, it
is unlikely that the double jeopardy clause would apply to such
actions.342 Yet, double jeopardy concerns are raised by qui tam actions,
even though brought by private parties. Because a qui tam plaintiff seeks
336. See Laura Nyantung Beny, Do Insider Trading Laws Matter? Some Preliminary
Comparative Evidence, 7 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 144, n. 16 ("A higher burden of proof
reduces the probability of success of prosecution and increases enforcement costs.").
337. See A. Jeff Ifrah, The Viability of Expanding Quality of Care Cases Under the
Federal False Claims Act, 16 HEALTH LAW. 26, 28 (2004); see also John C. Ruhnka, et
al., Qui Tam Claims: Threat to Voluntary Compliance Programs in Health Care
Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & L. 283, 302 (2000).
338. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
339. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1866.
340. See id. (citing United States v. Sanchez-Escareno, 950 F.2d 193, 200 (5th Cir.
1991)).
341. See id.; see also Askanase, supra note 332, at 481-82 (noting that "[b]ecause the
FCA authorizes parallel criminal and civil proceedings, it opens the possibility that a
person could be brought to trial first under the criminal FCA and then under the civil
FCA for the same fraudulent claims. If, in such a situation, the plaintiff sought punitive
damages, the accused party would have a claim of being put in double jeopardy").
342. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1868.
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punitive sanctions on behalf of the federal government, and because
punitive sanctions have been determined to implicate the double
jeopardy clause of the United States Constitution, actions by qui tam
plaintiffs should prevent the government from seeking subsequent
criminal remedies against the same defendants.
343
The few procedural rules that benefit the defendant in criminal
actions provide no relief for defendants in civil actions under the FCA.
Traditionally, the government had more resources and tools at its
disposal in criminal actions than civil plaintiffs did in private litigation to
seek out information and compel defendants to provide evidence. 344 The
tools available in criminal actions include police searches, custodial
interrogation, and grand jury investigations.34 5 Changes in the rules of
civil discovery in the last century have altered the legal landscape and
allowed far more access to information in civil proceedings than was
previously available.3 46 Under the new rules, full discovery prior to trial
was encouraged, allowing plaintiffs greater access to the records and
files of defendants in civil actions than was previously permitted.34 7 This
access further enhances the attraction of civil actions under the FCA. No
longer does the government need to seek information through means
only available in criminal proceedings. Rather, the government obtains
access to much of the same information in civil actions which, with their
lesser burden of proof, are far less costly to pursue than criminal actions
and far more likely to succeed.
Thus, despite the fact that corporate defendants in civil FCA actions
are subject to the same penalties as corporate defendants in criminal
actions, the procedural protections available to defendants under the
criminal law are not available to defendants in civil actions pursued
under the FCA. Not only does this discrepancy present inherent
problems of fairness to a corporate defendant, but it also encourages the
filing and settlement of weak or meritless qui tam cases. While a
corporate defendant need not have the same procedural safeguards as a
defendant in a criminal action, some heightened procedural protections
would ensure the fairness of proceedings under the FCA and discourage
the filing of meritless suits.
343. See id.
344. See id. at 1855.
345. Seeid. at 1811.
346. See id. at 1855-1856.
347. See id.
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B. Prosecutorial Discretion Problems Presented by Qui Tam Litigation
Under the FCA
Additional problems presented by the blurring of civil and criminal
law under the FCA result from the lack of prosecutorial discretion in
enforcing the qui tam provisions of the Act. The enforcement of
criminal and civil statutes prosecuted by the government necessarily
involves prosecutorial discretion in determining what crimes and
offenders to prosecute. 348 Government officials seek to enforce statutes
in ways which serve the public good.34 9 In deciding whether to bring an
action, prosecutors consider much more than merely whether a violation
of the law has occurred.35 °  Prosecutorial discretion involves
incorporating decisions about public benefit and private harm into a
calculus regarding whether to pursue an apparent violation of the law.
In determining whether or not to bring an action, government
officials will consider the harm caused by the defendant's wrongful
conduct. If the cost to pursue an action far outweighs the harm caused
by the defendant, a prosecutor may choose not to pursue litigation.351
Further, a prosecutor may decline to pursue mere technical violations of
a statute.352 Some statutes, particularly statutes involving the regulation
of economic activity, contain extensive and complicated rules by which
defendants must guide their conduct. Conduct which fails to abide by
the provisions of a statute technically violates the law, but may not cause
great harm to the public. Such conduct is often not litigated by the
government because there would be little benefit to the public relative to
the cost of pursuing the action.
353
Government prosecutors and agencies also decline to file actions
where they are unlikely to succeed on the merits of the case.354 Even in
civil cases under the FCA, where the burden of proof is a preponderance
of the evidence, if the government does not think it has the evidence to
348. See Note, Judging the Prosecution: Why Abolishing Peremptory Challenges
Limits the Dangers of Prosecutorial Discretion, 119 HARV. L. REv. 2121, 2123 (2006).
349. See id.
350. See Beck, supra note 112, at 610 (noting that a prosecutor will consider "the
likelihood of a successful outcome in a particular case, the deterrent value of the
prosecution, the blameworthiness of the particular defendant compared to other potential
defendants, the extent to which the defendant's conduct implicates the policies
underlying the statute, the effect of the prosecution on other interests of the public, and
other similar matters" when deciding whether to prosecute).
351. See WAYNE R. LAFAVE & JEROLD H. ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 13.2 (2d
ed. 1992).
352. See Beck, supra note 112, at 627-28.
353. See id. (discussing the premise of "discretionary nonenforcement" in the context
of overinclusive statutes).
354. See id. at 623-24.
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meet the burden of proof it may decline to file an action.355 This is
exemplified by the large percentage of qui tam actions filed by private
litigants in which the government declines to intervene.
356
In addition to exercising prosecutorial discretion by declining to
pursue apparent violations of the law, the state also exercises discretion
in deciding to prosecute specific offenders for public goals. 357 The state
may choose to prosecute offenders who cause great harm to the public or
high-profile offenders whose prosecution would discourage other
potential wrongdoers.3 58  The state may also decide to focus its
prosecutorial resources on repeat-offenders or defendants who engage in
the most blatant violations of the law.35 9
Prosecutorial discretion serves a crucial function in the enforcement
of public laws. The ability to choose who, when, and whether to pursue
legal action against a defendant allows the government to balance
competing public interests and determine whether litigation would
ultimately benefit the public good.360  "At some point, additional
enforcement efforts or stiffer penalties impose costs on the public, on
regulated individuals, or on third parties that threaten to outweigh any
corresponding deterrence and compensation gains.' 36'
Further, public prosecutors are forbidden from having a pecuniary
interest in the outcome of litigation that they pursue on behalf of the
government.362 This ensures that prosecutorial discretion is exercised
solely for the benefit of the public and not for the personal gain of the
prosecutor.363 Thus, prosecutorial discretion is an essential tool in
ensuring that actions pursued by the government serve the public and do
not impinge unnecessarily on liberty interests.
As discussed previously, qui tam relators pursue actions under the
FCA for monetary gain.364 While it is quite possible, even likely, that
many qui tam relators also wish to benefit the public by deterring fraud
against the government, the statute itself "operates by appealing to the
pecuniary interests of informers. 365 The statute provides successful qui
355. See id. at 610-13.
356. See Caldwell, supra note 174, at 385.
357. See Thirty-Fifth Annual Review of Criminal Procedure; II. Preliminary
Proceedings-Prosecutorial Discretion, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 203, 206-07
(2006) (noting that discretion to prosecute an offender is limited by the constitutional
protections of equal protection and due process).
358. Beck, supra note 112, at 610-11.
359. Id.
360. Id.
361. Id. at 609.
362. See Young v. United States, 481 U.S. 787 (1987).
363. See Beck, supra note 112, at 610-14.
364. See discussion supra Part III.B.
365. Beck, supra note 112, at 611.
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tam plaintiffs with significant financial reward.366 Indeed, the average
recovery of a successful qui tam relator is $1 million.367 The statute
provides no incentive, other than a financial incentive, to potential qui
tam plaintiffs.368
Thus, the FCA provides no incentive for qui tam relators to exercise
discretion in determining whom to sue. In other words, there is no
inducement for a qui tam plaintiff to adopt the doctrine of prosecutorial
discretion for a private suit.369 A qui tam relator who knows of technical
violations of the FCA is encouraged, by the provisions of the statute, to
sue. 370 Even if these technical violations of the statute resulted in very
little harm to the public, each violation results in up to $11,000 in
penalties, of which the relator is entitled to receive 15-30%. 3 1' Ten
technical violations of the statute that resulted in a total loss to the
government of $200 could potentially earn a qui tam relator $33,000.372
In addition, the attorney's fees of a successful qui tam relator are paid by
the defendant.373 Thus, there is every incentive for a qui tam plaintiff to
file suit for mere technical violations of a statute.
Qui tam relators are also incentivized to file suit even if their case is
weak and unlikely to succeed at trial. FCA suits frequently end in
settlement because of the heavy penalties and potential for
disqualification from federally funded programs, such as Medicare and
Medicaid.374  Qui tam suits are no exception to this rule. A qui tam
relator has a great deal of power to induce settlement.375 The potential
for the imposition of significant penalties is enough to cause many
defendants to think twice about taking a case to trial, even if the
366. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d) (2000).
367. See Androphy & Peavy supra note 111, at 130.
368. See generally 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3730.
369. See Lisa Michelle Phelps, Note, Calling Off the Bounty Hunters: Discrediting
the Use of Alleged Anti-Kickback Violations to Support Civil False Claims Actions, 51
VAND. L. REV. 1003, 1043 (1998). The FCA also provides no incentive for qui tam
plaintiffs to file suit soon after discovering the wrongful conduct, thereby preventing
further harm by the wrongdoer. See Heidi Boerstler, Qui Tam Claims: Threat to
Voluntary Compliance Programs in Health Care Organizations, 25 J. HEALTH POL.
POL'Y & L. 283, 300 (2000). In fact, the more harm done by the wrongdoer, the more a
potential qui tam plaintiff stands to gain when she does file suit. Id.
370. Beck, supra note 112, at 630.
371. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
372. See, e.g. Jost & Davies, supra note 3, at 259-60. "Even if individually quite
small, when the amounts wrongly claimed are trebled, and the number of claims is
multiplied by $5,000 to $10,000, astronomical sums are quickly reached. Two hundred
$50 false claims, for example, could result in sanctions of between $1,030,000 and
$2,030,000." Id. at 260.
373. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
374. See Frieden, supra note 133, at 1044.
375. See Forney, supra note 186, at 1359 (discussing the qui tam plaintiff's
"substantial power to dictate the nature of the action").
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plaintiffs case is unlikely to succeed. Thus, many qui tam cases are not
adjudicated before a judge, but decided in negotiations between
lawyers.3 36 Because of the great pressure to settle FCA cases, qui tam
relators risk little by filing a weak case under the Act. 377 At most, a qui
tam relator will lose money spent on attorneys' fees and court costs,
should the case be dismissed prior to settlement. However, the
likelihood that a case will settle or succeed at trial makes it unlikely that
many potential qui tam relators will refuse to file suit because their case
has little chance of success on the merits.
This is not to say that there is no exercise of prosecutorial discretion
in the litigation of qui tam actions under the FCA but rather, that such
exercise of discretion does not fully protect the interests of the public.
Recall that a qui tam plaintiff serves the government with his complaint
prior to serving the defendant and actively litigating the case.378 The
government has sixty days in which to determine whether to intervene in
the qui tam case.3 79 Just as it does in every other litigation it pursues, the
government weighs competing interests to determine if participation in
the litigation would benefit the public. In FCA actions, however, if the
government declines to participate in the litigation, (perhaps because the
case is unlikely to succeed, or perhaps because the claim reflects a mere
technical violation of the Act) the case is not automatically dismissed.
380
While the government does have the authority to move for dismissal of
FCA actions in which it declines to intervene, it rarely does so. 381 Thus,
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in qui tam actions under the FCA
merely ascertains whether the government will have an active role in the
litigation, and does not ultimately balance competing public interests or
determine if maintenance of the action will cause more societal harm
than benefit.
The lack of government oversight in many qui tam actions is also
problematic because of the large number of qui tam cases which settle.
As discussed in Part V of this Article, settlements can include not only
significant fines, but also the imposition of corporate integrity programs,
376. See Hyman, supra note 286, at 552 (noting that under the FCA "[p]roviders who
believe they are blameless are under tremendous pressure to settle because of the legal
expenses associated with mounting a defense and the high probability of bankruptcy and
professional disgrace if the jury does not see things the same way the provider does");
Joan H. Krause, Medical Error as False Claim, 27 AM. L.J. & MED. 181, 183 (2001)
(discussing the "tremendous pressure to settle" FCA actions).
377. See Beck, supra note 112, at 630.
378. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b).
379. See id.
380. Id. § 3730(c)(3) ("If the Government elects not to proceed with the action, the
person who initiated the action shall have the right to conduct the action.").
381. See Caldwell, supra note 174, at 377.
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the terms of which should not be decided by private plaintiffs with no
knowledge of the workings of the corporation. Further, structured
settlements can result from qui tam actions in which the government
does not intervene. In a structured settlement, a plaintiff and defendant
agree to construct the settlement terms to benefit the plaintiff as much as
possible, often reducing the amount recouped by the federal
government.3 82 As discussed in Part III.C. of this Article, some courts in
the United States have held that the government cannot veto such
settlements without a showing of good cause to the court overseeing the
case. Government oversight of the imposition of compliance programs
and the distribution of penalties, therefore, is essential for qui tam actions
to further the public good and function properly.
Commentators have suggested various remedies for the problems
associated with the blurring of criminal and civil law. It has been
suggested that a hybrid system of justice govern the imposition of
punitive sanctions in civil cases.383 Such a hybrid system would allow
for more procedural protections in civil actions than currently afforded to
defendants.3 84 While raising the burden of proof to a criminal standard
might shut down enforcement under the FCA altogether, a higher burden
of proof than the current preponderance of the evidence standard would
help protect the rights of defendants in these punitive civil actions. By
requiring a clear and convincing standard of proof in FCA actions, the
legislature would lessen the likelihood that meritless cases would result
in settlement. Further, raising the burden of proof to a clear and
convincing standard would reduce the likelihood that meritless or weak
qui tam cases would be filed under the FCA.
In addition to providing heightened procedural protections available
to FCA defendants, more government oversight of qui tam cases and
settlements is needed. Because qui tam plaintiffs are motivated by
monetary reward, they have no incentive to refrain from filing cases that
would cause more harm than benefit to the public.3 85 Under the current
provisions of the statute, the government can seek dismissal of the action
provided there is an opportunity for a hearing on the motion.386 Further,
if the government declines to intervene in a qui tam action under the
FCA, it can seek to later participate in the action upon a showing of good
382. See Frieden, supra note 133, at 1072-73.
383. See Mann, supra note 1, at 1869-72.
384. See id. (arguing that "the procedure followed in deciding whether to impose a
sanction should be related to the function of the sanction... the more the severe the
sanction, the more the procedure must protect against the sanctioning of the innocent, and
[] the more it must protect the accused's dignity and privacy").
385. See Beck, supra note 112, at 611.
386. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(2)(A).
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cause. 387 I would argue that a new standard should be adopted, whereby
qui tam actions, in which the government declines to intervene, should
be dismissed unless the qui tam plaintiff can show good cause why the
case should continue on without the government's involvement. This
would ensure that meritless and weak FCA cases would not clog up our
federal court system. It would also ensure that the interests of the public
are met, and provide some protection to defendants in place of
prosecutorial discretion. The statute should also be amended to not only
allow for government intervention in settlements between qui tam
relators and defendants, but require such intervention. This would ensure
that settlements in qui tam actions reflect the best interests of the public
and that the compliance programs imposed are a result of some
governmental input.
Finally, guidelines should be established for the imposition and
content of CIAs and compliance programs in civil actions. It should not
be left to the discretion of a private litigant to determine the terms
imposed in a compliance program governing the inner workings of a
corporation. Corporate integrity agreements and similar devices were
first utilized in the imposition of criminal sanctions against a corporation
after the creation of the Sentencing Guidelines for organizations. 388 The
use of these agreements has both expanded and evolved, and now CIAs
are prescribed in the settlement of civil litigation with far more onerous
terms than originally imposed in criminal sentencing. Because these
agreements often contain conditions not enforced by statute and can be
imposed by private civil litigation, which does not take into account
governmental policy considerations, the use of corporate compliance
programs can infringe upon the province of the legislature and impose
criminal liability where none was originally intended. Thus, the
utilization of CIAs, particularly in FCA actions with its qui tam
provisions, blurs the line between criminal and civil litigation and
penalties. While more extensive judicial oversight of the creation and
imposition of CIAs may help lessen the problems associated with the
agreements, it is up to the legislature to enact laws that more clearly
define industry compliance standards and ensure that the policy rationale
behind laws are not ignored in the pursuit of violators.
VII. Conclusion
The Federal False Claims Act serves an important function in
detecting and deterring fraud upon the government of the United States.
By enlisting the public as private prosecutors in such actions, the statute
387. Id. § 3730(c)(3).
388. See U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL ch. 8 (1998).
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ensures heightened enforcement and obtains compensation for losses
sustained by the federal government as a result of fraudulent activity.
The monetary incentives provided by the statute encourage reporting of
wrongful activity and provide compensation for the sacrifices typically
sustained by whistleblowers. Thus, the qui tam provisions of the FCA
bring to light wrongful conduct that might never be discovered or
addressed without the ability of private citizens to benefit financially
from filing suit.
The FCA, however, is also rife with problems that stem from the
overlap of criminal and civil law generated by the statute. Traditional
distinctions between criminal and civil law are blurred by the provisions
of the FCA, which allow for private individuals to enforce public laws
without having suffered injury from the wrongful conduct. By
encouraging private parties to maintain punitive actions on behalf of the
public good, the FCA blurs the line between criminal and civil law.
Further, in the context of actions brought against corporate defendants,
the penalties available in FCA civil suits are identical to those available
in criminal prosecutions. Thus, the ability of individuals to enforce the
provisions of the FCA through qui tam suits results in a near-complete
overlap between criminal and civil law.
Yet, despite this overlap, the FCA fails to safeguard the rights of
corporate defendants in FCA actions. By failing to provide procedural
safeguards available in criminal actions and furnishing no incentive to
private plaintiffs to exercise discretion in filing suit, the FCA places far
too much power in the hands of individuals. Simple changes to the
statute would address these concerns and ensure fair and just application
of the FCA. By returning the burden of proof to the clear and convincing
standard in place prior to the 1986 amendments to the FCA and requiring
greater government oversight of qui tam actions, Congress would ensure
that the statute adequately roots out fraud upon the federal government,
while providing protection against the unfairness currently embodied
within the statute's terms.
The blurring of criminal and civil law is a recent phenomenon that
is exemplified in criminal statutes addressing conduct traditionally
redressed through civil litigation and civil statutes used to punish conduct
traditionally prosecuted under criminal law. This trend of increasing
convergence of criminal and civil law shows no signs of slowing, as
more and more statutes typifying the overlap are enacted. However,
Congress needs to be diligent in ensuring that laws which blur the line
between criminal and civil law do not sacrifice protections which
guarantee fairness in the American system of justice. Procedural
protections and governmental oversight would ensure that equity is not
sacrificed when utilizing private litigation to accomplish public goals.
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Thus, such considerations should be incorporated into statutes like the
False Claims Act, securing the fairness of litigation under the Act, while
at the same time protecting the statute's public purpose.

